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Introduction
Economists  have  always  perceived the  importance  of  economic  development 
and  growth.  Such  attention  is  easily  understandable  considering  the  influence  that 
growth has on human well-being.  A lot of studies, both empirical and theoretical, have 
been  published  as  attempts  to  explain  disparities  among  countries:  many  theories 
flourished, none of which, though, provide an entirely convincing explanation and, in 
some cases, give rise to contrary policy recommendations.
In this  field,  lately,  the debate has  largely been focused on the controversial 
question of convergence, divergence or polarization among countries or regions with 
different  levels  of  welfare.  However,  in  spite  of  the  number  of  works,  empirical 
evidence does not offer any conclusive result in favour of one of the positions.
The question of economic convergence whether among countries or regions of 
the European Union has always had a special interest: the explanation can be found 
mainly in the raison d'être of the Union, since one of the basic principles on which it is 
based is integration and convergence is necessary to the purpose of attaining the highest 
possible level of economic and social cohesion, as stated in the new Union Treaty.
In the last ten years, then, there have been two big happenings which renew the 
interest at community level: a new currency has been adopted by many members and 
EU experienced the biggest enlargement of its history.  Such events refresh the needing 
of testing at which stage European inequalities stand and if after them there were further 
significant improvements in convergence.
The  existence  of  many  methods  of  assessing  it  –  developed  during  several 
decades of researches – and the absence so far of an analysis which applies them to the 
regions  of  new  European  Union,  comprehensive  of  27  countries,  has  been  the 
fundamental arguments which made me think that there were space for a study as the 
following.
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I.1  Brief History of Process of European Integration
The first ideas concerning a union among European countries dawned after the 
Second World War with the primary aim of guaranteeing them a long-lasting peace.
In  1951 European Cool  and  Steel  Community (ECSC)  began  to  join  its  six 
members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) in economic 
and political field and in 1957 they merged into a more general European Economic 
Community (EEC) which had, among its goals, the creation of a single common market 
characterised by free movements of goods, services, workers and capitals.
The first enlargement occurred in 1973 with the entries of Denmark, Ireland and 
United Kingdom and in the following years there was the end of the last European right-
wing dictatorships with the fall of Salazar in Portugal (1974) and the death of Franco in 
Spain (1975). In the same years community policy started to design structural funds for 
less developed regions, aimed to create job positions and build infrastructures and in 
1979 the first universal suffrage elections for European Parliament took place.
In 1981 Greece became the tenth member of EEC, while Portugal and Spain 
joined the Community in 1986 when it  was signed the Single European Act,  which 
provided for solving the problems that still affected the free exchanges among countries 
and thus created  the common market. In 1989 the fall of Berlin Wall was the beginning 
of  the  process  of  reunification  of  Germany which  soon was united  again.  Just  few 
months passed before the fall of all communist regimes, historical events which indeed 
had the result of making closer European people.
In  1993  the  common  market  was  completed,  based  on  the  four  freedom 
mentioned before; in the same year in Maastricht it was signed the Treaty on European 
Union which  turned the  Economic  Community indeed into  a  Union and led  to  the 
creation  of  the  single  European  currency,  the  Euro.  In  1995  Austria,  Finland  and 
Sweden joined the Union, in a framework where the Schengen Agreement had already 
created a European borderless area  which today still operates much like a single state 
for international travels with border controls for travellers travelling in and out of the 
area, but with no internal border controls. It was then emblematic the development of 
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Erasmus Programme (European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University 
Students), which has been allowing to millions of young people to study in a foreign 
country.1 In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the Maastricht Treaty, putting a 
greater emphasis on citizenship and individual rights; two years later, in Nice, a new 
Treaty reformed the institutional structure of the European Union in the prevision of an 
eastward expansion.
1st of January 2002 was an historical date, since the new single currency started 
to circulate in 12 countries2 which first adopted Euro. In 2004 with the entry of eight 
former  communist  countries  (Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Czech  Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) the divisions between Eastern and Western Europe, 
arose  after  Second  World  War,  could  be  considered  concluded;  together  with  such 
countries, Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta joined the Union too; then it was 
the turn of unratified “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”,  an attempt to 
create a consolidated constitution for European Union which would have replaced the 
existing EU treaties with a single text. In 2007, while also Slovenia adopted the Euro – 
preceding Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Estonia – Bulgaria and Romania were the last to 
join the Union, although they have not been included in Schengen Area; Lisbon Treaty 
amended the previous treaties, which comprised the constitutional basis of EU, with the 
stated aim of completing “the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the 
Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the 
Union and to improving the coherence of its action.“  
Today there are still many people who think that Europe should be endowed of a 
true constitution, however an agreement on this subject appears hard to achieve and the 
debate on the future of European Union is open more than ever before.
I.2  Database
The choice of records object of the analysis is a step of basic importance, since 
all the researches show that results are very susceptible to aggregations of data took in 
consideration, both under a geographical and economical point of view.
1 With obvious effects in terms of culture of integration for new generations.
2 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and Greece.
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All the data, but two3, come from Eurostat regional database and a description of 
their characteristics is provided in sections 3.3.1 and 5.3.1. 
We will  use  monetary  variables  expressed  in  Purchasing  Power  Standard  in 
order to reflect in a better way the standard of living of people from different regions4.
Geographically,  the  aggregation  considered  is  the  Eurostat  standard 
Nomenclature d'Unités Territoriales Statistiques  (NUTS) at level 2. NUTS-2 should 
identify  regions  with  population  from  800,000  to  3  millions,  but  actually  such 
thresholds are not used rigidly: regional context is very heterogeneous, we pass from 
20,000 inhabitants of  Åland (Finland) to a population of about 10 million, like those of 
Île de France or Lombardy; the same happens if we look at regional surface, since there 
are  regions smaller than 1,000 km2  (for example Brussels and Malta) and on the other 
side we register the extreme case of Övre Norrland (Sweden) with its 165,296 km2. It 
appears  logical  that  Eurostat  should  reorganize  better  these  divisions  and we could 
indeed  use  another  aggregation  to  test  convergence,  nevertheless  European  Union 
chooses to act at this geographical level in order to promote cohesion5 and it is mainly 
for this reason that we have chosen to use it: if there are any effect due to community 
policies, it should be registered at NUTS-2 level. A complete list of regions involved is 
provided in Annex.
Finally,  time  period  from  1995  to  2007  is  chosen  in  order  to  have  a 
representative interval of years for capturing what was the situation before the important 
events mentioned before and their impact. We have used income statistics until the last 
regional observations available, those of 20076, to have the newest data for representing 
the present situation,  even if  it  must  be remembered that,  after  that year,  the world 
experienced a big financial crisis, followed by another relevant economic crisis, which, 
to some extent, have changed the scenario. In any case, in this analysis we tried not to 
forget what has happened after 2007 and in some considerations this aspect will emerge 
clearly. 
3 Democracy index and index of political situation.
4 PPS is used by the most growth scientists and we think that especially in a European framework these 
can be a very reliable values.
5 Structural  funds are, in fact,  basicly allocated in accordance with NUTS-2 division, even if many 
scientists suggest that the NUTS-1 level might be the only one pertinent especially in case of the 
smallest countries.
6 Regional database takes more time than national statistics to be prepared.
8
I.2  DATABASE
I.3  Highlights
Chapter 1 presents a summary of the neoclassical models of economic growth – 
both exogenous and endogenous – which will be used as theoretical basis for assessing 
convergence. After the introduction of the models there is a review of the results that 
can  be  found  in  literature  through  the  use  of  alternative  methods  for  assessing 
convergence.
Chapter 2 shows the results of a conventional7 analysis focused on β coefficient 
carried out through the estimate of linear regression on panel data. Starting from this, 
there are then deeper examinations of the characteristics of convergence clubs and of 
some national peculiarity.
In chapter 3 it is used the method proposed by Quah (1993,1996b), involving 
Markovian  systems,  for  executing  a  non-parametric  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of 
evolution of income. On these bases we try then to inquire into the reasons that may 
have caused the relative mobility of European regions.
Chapter 4 separates regional convergence from economic growth and presents an 
analysis made with a traditional tool8 (Theil Index) which allows to distinguish between 
inter-county disparity and intra-country inequality.
In Chapter 5 we come back to use the concept of  β-Convergence through the 
Barro's  approach  and all  it  will  be  debated  the  quantitative  effect  of  each  variable 
influencing growth.
Before the Annex, where it is provided the list of the regions, it is presented a 
summary of the results obtained with and some final considerations.
7 As called by Cuadrado-Roura, Mancha-Navarro and Garrido-Yserte, 2002.
8 In the sense specified in Section 1.2.
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1-Theories of Economic Development and Results
1.1  Theories
The purpose of this section is providing the key elements of the theories that 
empirically  we  are  going  to  assess  later  and  which  have  specific  importance  in  a 
European regional framework.
We will  consider  neoclassical  models  which  base  their  roots  in  the  standard 
model formulated independently in 1956 by Solow and Swan. Neoclassical economists 
essentially maintain that regions with similar preferences which have access to the same 
technologies will converge toward the same steady-state level of per capita income, thus 
poorer regions will catch up the richest.
The  standard  formulation  of  the  Solow-Swan  model  depicts  how  saving, 
population growth and technological progress influence an economy per capita output 
and  its  temporal  evolution.  It  emerges  that  one  of  the  most  important  variable  for 
explaining  economic  growth is  capital  per  worker,  but  it  is  generally  accepted  that 
human capital and changes in technologies play a role even more relevant.
Considering first a closed economy which has perfectly competitive markets and 
constant returns to scale, we can write the aggregate production function at time  t  as 
follows:
Y t = F K t , L t×E t     [1.1] 
where  Y  is real production;  K  is total stock of capital;  L  is labour supply that is equal 
to total population since we assume full employment and  E  is a measure of labour 
efficiency. This variable is mainly affected by two dimensions: the knowledge of the 
workers and the disposable technology. E increases, for example, with computerization 
or  automation,  but  also  in  correspondence  of  better  health  conditions,  education  or 
professional  skills.  Hence L×E represents  the  effective  labour  force  or  effective 
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worker.
Leaving out the subscript  t , we can rewrite equation 1.1 as:
 = f                 [1.2] 
where = Y /L×E and = K / L×E that is, quantities per effective workers.
Omitting  government,  product  per  effective  worker  is  allocated  between 
consumption and investment: if we assume that agents save a fraction  s  of their income 
and thus consume a fraction 1−s we can write the following relation:
 = 1−s i                           [1.3] 
which brings us to the conclusion that saving rate correspond to the share of income that 
is formed by investments.
If we substitute equation [1.2] in equation [1.3], rearranging we find:
i = s⋅ f                [1.4] 
which relates the existing stock of capital per effective worker with the accumulation of 
new capital.
Assuming a rate of depreciation of capital of  δ  net investment is given by:
K˙ = sY−K               [1.5] 
but if we want to find the evolution of capital per effective worker, we must take in 
consideration also the growth of population  L – which is at a constant rate  n – and 
labour efficiency growth. The simplest hypothesis about  E  is assuming an exogenous 
labour-augmenting  technological  progress  at  rate  g .  In  conclusion  the  number  of 
effective  workers  grows  every  period  at  the  rate   (n+g) ,  hence  we  can  write  the 
temporal evolution of capital per effective worker as:
12
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˙ = s⋅f −ng               [1.6] 
On the households side, they are assumed to maximise lifetime utility given by:
U = ∫u c e−t d t                  [1.7] 
where  c   is per capita consumption C/L and  is a discount factor which reflects 
temporal preferences. For computational reasons we assume a utility function with form
u c  = c
1−−1
1−
               [1.8]
which  has  the  advantage  of  having  constant  marginal  utility  u ' c =− . 
Maximising [1.7] with respect to  c  subject to [1.8], we find the optimal time path for 
consumption per worker
c˙ /c =  f ' −−/   [1.9]  
that will converge asymptotically to the steady-state path for any initial level of  K  and 
L .
In the steady-state the quantities per effective worker  ψ*, κ*  and consumption 
are constant; per capita  output  y , per capita capital  k  and per capita consumption  c 
experience a growth equal to the rate of technological progress  g   and the aggregate 
quantities of income, capital and consumption grow up at the constant rate gn .
This  model  has  clear  implications  in  terms  of  convergence.  We can  specify 
equation [1.1] with a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y t = k t
 Lt e
g t1−             [1.10] 
which in per capita terms becomes:
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y t =
eg t Lt
1−
L t
K  = e g t 1− Lt
− K t
 = eg t 1−k t
                  [1.11] 
Remembering the relation:
K t /Lt = k t = t∗e
g t             [1.12] 
we can write equation [1.6] substituting y= f  and we have:
˙
 t
= se g t 1−k t
−1 − ng = st
−1 − − n g              [1.13] 
This last expression can be decomposed in net capital accumulation per effective worker
Figure 1.1  Traditional neoclassical model of exogenous growth for two economies with  
different initial endowments of capital and same technologies and propensity to save. 
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st
−1− and growth rate of population in terms of efficiency units  (n+g) . The first 
term  is  a  decreasing  function  of t since 1 according  to  the  hypothesis  of 
diminishing marginal productivity of production factors, hence growth rate of capital 
per  effective worker,  as represented in figure 1.1,  is  high in  correspondence of low 
levels of t : with such levels of capital, its marginal productivity is high and it is 
consequently  high  its  accumulation.  Moving  along  the  curve  on  the  right,  the 
accumulation  slows  down,  since  with  more  abundant  capital,  its  productivity  has 
decreased.  The curve of  net  capital  accumulation  and the  constant   (n+g)  meet  in 
correspondence of  κ*  which, as we have seen, is the steady-state quantity that remains 
unchanged through time and which is reached automatically by economic systems that 
works as described.
We can easily see that in this model a less developed economy experiences a 
higher, but decreasing, growth rate until capital per effective worker will not reach  κ*, 
the constant rate growth path; whereas an area which is more endowed of capital grows 
at a lower and still decreasing rate, but converging again toward the same steady-state 
quantity.
If we do not consider technological progress, it is sufficient that output grows of 
n  to avoid unemployment, but taking into account   g  it is necessary that production 
compensates it,  otherwise it would be possible to employ less workers for the same 
level of output. In this sense  g  acts as the number of workers increases.
Suppose now that technological progress is like a manna from the sky, a free 
good, disposable for every country without difficulties or delays. In this way  g  would 
be the same everywhere. Hence:
• the growth rate of per capita income tends to such value;
• the growth rate of per capita income is higher when capital per worker is low;
• per  capita  income level  tends  everywhere to  the steady-state  path relative to
∗eg t .
These statements are the foundations of the neoclassical theory of convergence 
which predicts absolute convergence, that is economies which are poorer in per capita 
income levels tend to grow faster than richer economies. Nevertheless, if we remove the 
15
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assumption about perfect mobility and reproducibility of technological progress or if we 
allow saving rates  and growth rate  of  population  to  vary across  countries,  we may 
observe different steady-state growth rate of per capita income and different steady-state 
paths: this is the basic idea of conditional convergence, which is conditioned by the 
other variables of the model.
Solow-Swan  model  prescinds  from  monetary  considerations.  This  can  be  a 
serious  omission  at  worldwide  level,  but  such  considerations  are  less  important  at 
regional level, especially considering that 174 over 271 EU regions have today the same 
currency.  However  the openness  of  the  system cannot  be ignore neither  at  regional 
level,  thus factor  mobility and diffusion of technological  changes  become important 
issues. 
In  contrast  to  the  neoclassical  theories  there  are,  among others,  the  ideas  of 
Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1970), according to which a greater integration may allow 
the more developed areas to exploit more completely agglomeration economies through 
scale and density effects. The result of such effects is leading to further divergence. This 
topic is examined also by the so-called “new economic geography” since the beginning 
of 90s9.
The  better  way  of  capturing  the  phenomenon  of  technological  spillover  is 
developing a model which explicitly considers human capital.
Romer (1986) relaunched the growth literature with a paper  that presented a 
model of increasing returns in which there was a positive steady-state growth rate that 
resulted from endogenous accumulation of knowledge10.
Technological change can be considered a labour augmenting process: suppose 
now that the effective labour input is equal to:
L×E = L T [1.14]  
where   T  is  a  measure  of  the  average  quality  of  labour,  depending  of  skills  like 
theoretical knowledges and practical experiences. It can be seen that Solow-Swan model 
9 For a detailed discussion of neokeynesian regional growth theories see McCombie (1988b).
10 We present this model following notation used by Button-Pentecost (2002).
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is a particular case for which growth rate of  T  equals to  g . 
The evolution of  T  follows the process of knowledge creation given by:
T˙ = H R /L , T     [1.15]
where  R  represents the total expenditures on activities such us education, training and 
Research & Development originated both from public and private sector. Change in  T 
is  thereby positively related  to  current  level  of  labour  quality  and to  the  effort  for 
improving such level.
This effort can be measured by fraction  m  of annual output that is aimed to the 
process of technical change:
Rt = mY t [1.16]  
In  this  way,  it  arises  a  temporal  trade-off,  because  m reduces  current 
consumption, but allows a higher level of income in the future.
If  production function is  the same of equation [1.2],  then substituting it  and 
[1.16] in [1.15] and remembering that =Y /L T we can write the growth rate of  T 
as follows:
T˙
T
= H  R
L T
,1 = h m = hm⋅f  [1.17]  
Households maximise again their lifetime utility as they did in function [1.5], 
even if now they must take decision about two variable: propensity to consumption and 
propensity  to  allocate  resources  to  technical  improvement.  Hence  the  steady-state 
growth rate of per capita income, differently from the standard neoclassical model, is 
now function not only of  κ , but of  m  too. Assuming that propensity to save affects the 
capital  accumulation  as  in  Solow-Swan  model,  labour  input  again  grows  at  the 
exogenous rate  n , on the steady-state growth path – where  s  and  m  are constant – the 
growth equation, similarly to [1.6] is:
17
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˙
 t
=
s⋅ f t
t
−  − [n h m⋅ f t]   [1.18]  
Figure 1.2  Neoclassical model with endogenous human capital accumulation.
From this equation and observing figure 1.2 we can establish that:
• if  propensity  to  save  raises,  then  growth  rate  of  per  capita  income  and  κ* 
increase;
• if capital depreciation rate raises, then growth rate of per capita income and  κ* 
decrease;
• if population growth rate increases, then aggregate output grows faster, but  κ* 
and per capita income decrease;
• if propensity to allocate resources to technical improvement increases, then  κ* 
decreases, but aggregate and per capita output raise.
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The endogenous model we have just analysed still assumes the growth rate of 
population as exogenous.
Considering that differences in the natural growth rates of population among EU 
regions are not very significant we should focus in net migration which, in a framework 
where  people  may  move  freely  across  countries,  plays  a  very  important  role  in 
explaining the evolution of regional population and human capital.
In  perfectly  competitive  markets,  production  factors  are  paid  their  marginal 
product, hence if capital per effective worker equal to  κ  we can obtain that real wage in 
every  period  is  e h m f  t f  −  f '  and  while  capital,  according  to  the 
neoclassical model, flows to regions where its per capita amount is low, net migration 
will  be  from  low  income  regions  to  rich  regions.  Actually,  due  to  capital  market 
imperfection and uncertainties,  real  risk-adjusted rate of return of capital  investment 
differential  are  small  (Mankiw  1995)  and,  similarly,  human  capital  migrates  from 
regions where it is scarce to areas where it is abundant (Lucas 1988), a kind of brain-
drain effect.
We can express the change in population and thus labour supply, dividing natural 
growth and net migration:
L˙ = n L  M [1.19]
with  M  follows an evolution given by:
M = q L L f  w − w f  [1.20]
where  q  measures the speed of response of labour factor, which is imperfectly mobile, 
to real wage differentials and  f  stands for foreign.
Inserting equations [1.19] and [1.20] in a model as [1.18] we find a new growth 
equation as the following:
19
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˙
 t
=
s⋅ f t
t
−  − {n  q [e h m f  t f  −  f '  − w f ] L f  h m⋅f t}
[1.21]
This model illustrates that:
• in  poorer  regions  with  a  lower  real  wage,  emigration  raises  the  capital  per 
effective worker and thus increases its real wage level;
• regions  with  higher  income  attract  immigrants  who  have  the  effect  of 
diminishing  κ  and then slowing down the real wage growth.
In conclusion, migration should be an equilibrating mechanism, but what this 
model does not take into account is the effect of immigrants on technological change: 
since they are persons already skilled, who take with them their human capital there 
could  be  gains  from their  movements  (brain-drain  effect)  not  captured  by equation 
[1.21].  Empirical  findings  suggest  that,  in  most  cases,  immigration  in  developed 
countries  has  raised  their  per  capita  GDP,  that  is  positive  impact  in  terms  of 
technological  change,  new  ideas,  and  investments  has  bigger  size  than  simple 
depressing effect described by the model and therefore such factor reallocation can lead 
to divergence due to cumulative causations rather than reducing regional disparities. 
1.2  Results
We can distinguish different streams in studies concerning regional convergence:
first,  the  contribution  provided  by  regional  scientists,  which  it  may  be  called 
traditional11, whose main reference may be considered the book by Molle, van Holst and 
Smit (1980): an analysis carried out with one of these tools will be presented in Chapter 
4,  through  the  use  of  Theil  Index;  second,  the  contributions  coming  from 
macroeconomic  field  of  economic  growth,  that  might  basicly  be  divided  in  β-
Convergence  parametric  method  –  which  was  particularly  developed  in  numerous 
analyses by Barro and Sala-i-Martin – that will be presented in Chapter 2 and 5; and the 
others, among which, it deserves particular attention non-parametric method proposed 
by Quah (1993,1996b)12, whose ideas are the inspiration for the analysis presented in
11 Terrasi, 2002.
12 Quah  offered  ample  and  systematic  critics  to  Barro's  approach,  contesting  the  significance  of  β 
coefficient and stating that the right way to analyse convergence is studying the dynamics of the entire 
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Table 1.1  Previous researches about convergence in Europe
Authors Sample Peculiarities Results
Traditional studies
Molle, van Holst 
and Smit (1980)
76 EU9 
regions.
1950-1970.
Use of different 
indexes of disparity. 
Denmark, Ireland 
and UK had not 
joined EEC yet.
Generalised decrease in disparity 
especially in the first decade. The 
most of total regional inequality is 
due to between-country component. 
Suarez-Villa and 
Cuadrado-Roura 
(1993); Dunford 
(1995)
EU12 regions. 
1950-1990.
Convergence process stopped in the 
last 70s and a phase of divergence 
was experienced at the beginning of 
80s.
β-Convergence studies
Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991)
73 regions from 
7 EU countries.
1950-1985.
Conditioned for 
country-effect and 
economic structure.
Stable estimate of β with a value 
almost equal to 2%.
Armstrong 
(1995a, 1995b)
85 EU12 
regions.
1950-1992.
Idem. Different convergence phases, with 
β under 2%. Slow down of 
convergence in 70s and 80s. Not 
confirmed the existence of 
convergence clubs within EU 
regions.
Neven and 
Gouyette (1995)
140 EU12 
NUTS-2.
1980-1989.
Use of spatial factors Convergence in the first part of 80s, 
but not in the second. Spatially, 
Southern regions converged at 
4.4% a year in the first sub-period 
while North stagnated and vice 
versa in the second sub-period
Other studies
Fingleton, 
Lewney and 
Pinelli (1996)
169 EU12 
NUTS-2.
1975-1993.
Research for the 
European 
Commission on the 
effect of Single 
Market Programme.
Faster convergence in the period 
after 1987.  In the same years 
country-effect lose significance. 
1993 distribution is less polarized 
than in 1975.
Cheshire and 
Carbonaro 
(1995, 1996)
118 Functional 
Urban Regions 
(FUR).
 1979-1990.
Importance of 
regional delimitation. 
Explanatory variables 
for testing spatial 
factors.
Peripheral areas grew faster than the 
central ones, whereas the core areas 
had grown faster from 1960 to 
1975.
Quah and Magrini 
(1999), Cheshire 
& Magrini (1999)
122 EU FUR
1978-1994.
Idem. Emergence of a divergence process.
distribution.
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1-THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS
Chapter 3.  In this section  we propose  a non-exhaustive  review of  the most  important
empirical findings about the evolution of EU regional income disparities obtained with 
the different methods of research. They are shown in table 1.1.
In short,  these  studies  show a  clear  process  of  convergence  occurred among 
European regions at least since 1950 and up to 1970; during the 1970s it was registered 
a  slow  down  in  convergence,  due  also  to  the  international  economic  framework; 
whereas  the  direction  of  the  process  in  the  1980s  is  controversial,  but  all  the  way 
convergence does not seem fast. What happened after is shown in the next chapters.
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convergence
In this chapter we are going to use linear regressions on panel data to assess the 
existence of convergence – measured with the usual parameter  β – both absolute and 
conditional through the setting of a fixed effects model. In section 1 there is a resume of 
the  methodological  framework,  followed  by  empirical  results  and  consequent 
observations  shown  in  section  2.  Section  3  explores  which  are  the  common 
characteristics of regions pertaining to the different groups of convergence, features that 
can explain reasons why such different clusters have been created. In section 4, EU 
countries are divided in those which show a relevant country-effect and those which 
show clue  of  polarization  inside  themselves  and then  it  is  presented  an  analysis  of 
situation of the latter. Finally section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
2.1  General and Methodological Framework
We start the analysis of regional convergence setting the traditional model in 
order to observe and study the general trend highlighted during the period from 1995 to 
2007. Convergence is also computed for two sub-periods (1995-2001 and 2001-2007) 
for assessing if there is any difference in the size of the process. Although this kind of 
approach hides a lot of important elements necessary to understand the complexity of 
the changes happened in EU even in a not long lag, this is the natural starting point: 
further and more detailed analysis will be provided afterwards.
We are going to test two well-known concepts of convergence in the literature 
about regional growth: absolute β-convergence and conditional β-convergence, referred 
to per capita GDP.  The analysis is carried out using annual panel data over 264 EU 
NUTS-2 regions (data for the whole lag of time are not available for Denmark and for 
two regions of Scotland, in both cases due to changes in the borders).
The  aim  of  studying  β-convergence  is  to  see  if  the  heterogeneity  of  the 
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distribution of per capita GDP among regions tend to increase or decrease over time, in 
other words if regions which start in a lower income position tend to experience higher 
growth  rates  –  as  predicted  in  the  neoclassical  theory  –  that  eventually  allow  the 
development of a catching up process that let the less wealthy countries to converge 
toward the level of the richest ones.
In  formal  terms  absolute  β-convergence  is  tested  in  accordance  with  the 
following linear model on panel data13 with the variables expressed in logarithms:
Δ y i t − Δ y t = β  yi t−1 − y t−1  v i t   [2.1]  
The first term shows the difference between per capita GDP growth of the i-th 
region  in  period  t with  respect  to  the  Union's  average  during  the  same  period. 
Explanatory variable is the relative level of regional GDP per inhabitant of the previous 
period.
With the availability of panel data we may estimate the existence of conditional 
β-convergence using the following equation: 
Δ y i t − Δ y t = i  β  y i t−1 − y t−1  v i t     [2.2]  
The  new  parameters  i ,  which  are  now  included,  allow  us  to  test  the 
existence  of  specific  regional  factors  influencing  the  convergence  of  regions  and 
pushing them toward their own steady state. This is possible through the use of regional 
dummy variables and implies the estimation of a panel fixed effects model. This model 
enables us to assess all the hypotheses that underlie the concept of convergence, both 
absolute and conditional. If  β  is lesser than 0 and  i= ,∀ i differences between 
rich and poor regions decrease and tend to cancel each other out, hence all of them will 
move toward the same stationary state. However if i≠ inter-regional disparities in 
per capita GDP stabilise themselves and each region will move toward its own steady 
state.
13 Model [2.1] and [2.2] are used by Cuadrado-Roura, Mancha-Navarro and Garrido-Yserte, 2002.
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2.2  Empirical Results
The  results  of  the  estimations  shown in  table  2.1  push  us  to  the  following 
considerations:
1. In the whole period considered, the rate of absolute β-convergence is just 1,44%. 
Such a rate is even lower than the very common average  β  of around 2% found 
many  times  in  the  literature.  This  result  means  that  the  period  to  half 
convergence is 48 years, hence the data show a very slow process.
Table 2.1  Estimation of  β-Convergence in per Capita GDP (linear models.
1995-2007 1995-2001 2001-2007
Absolute Conditional 
(Fixed Eff.)
Absolute Conditional 
(Fixed Eff.)
Absolute Conditional 
(Fixed Eff.)
β -0.0144 -0.1182 -0.0029 -0.3812 -0.0276 -0.1916
t-value -11.13 -11.83 -1.49 -18.98 -17.06 -11.52
t-prob 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.0377 0.2144 0.0014 0.3785 0.1553 0.5047
Num. Obs. 3168 3168 1584 1584 1584 1584
H1 48 6 239 2 25 4
        1 An interesting measure to take into account is the convergence time for a given convergence 
rate β. Considering equation [2.1] and [2.2] we can say that time t , where y t is halfway between 
initial level y0 and steady-state level y*, satisfies the condition e−t = 1 /2 , hence we can 
get the number of years necessary to halve regional economic gap  H  by solving log 2/ .
2. The comparison of the two sub-periods,  that can be graphically appraised in 
figure  2.1,  suggests  that  convergence did not  take place during the  fist  one, 
whereas  the  parameter  is  significant  in  the  second  one.  This  implies  that 
disparities decreased mainly or only since 2002. No explanation can be given 
with this type of analysis, but 2002 is a very emblematic year, since the so far 
biggest step toward EU cohesion was carried out: the new European currency 
actually began to circulate in 165 over 264 regions; moreover just a year later 
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the most important enlargement in the history of the Union was approved and, in 
2004, 10 eastern and ex-communist countries (41 NUTS-2 regions) joined EU: 
the better integration of these economies with Western Europe could  have given 
a new and more intense impulse to convergence.
3. The fixed effects models are statistically more consistent14 since the tests over 
the existence of regional effects suggest to reject the hypothesis that  i=0
and provide different results: the values of  β  are much higher than the formers, 
and  R2 - statistics show a satisfactory goodness-of-fit even if adjusted. The 
period to half convergence is approximately 4 years and such process took place 
also between 1995 and 2001. This means that the conditional convergence exists 
and it is not slow, since per capita GDP tends to stabilise itself among regions in 
the middle term.
4. The existence  of  conditional  convergence  implies  the  estimation  of  different 
equilibrium states under the form i / and, in general, shows that regions of 
EU have  different  behaviours.  Considering  only  the  magnitude  of  the  fixed 
effects we can distinguish three kind of region:
• those one with positive fixed effects, that is 62 regions having factors which 
positively contribute to their steady state;
• 96  regions  with  negative  fixed  effects,  which  indicates  the  presence  of 
factors slowing down their convergence;
• a last  group of 106 regions for which the estimated fixed effects  are not 
statistically different from zero15. This means that for these areas no factors 
improving  or  slowing  down  convergence  have  been  detected,  hence  we 
should find such regions around a line of absolute convergence, representing 
the average situation.
5. From regional fixed effects it can be noticed a clear pattern and regularities in 
14 Analysis of residuals is quite satisfactory for all the regressions executed.
15 A t-prob of 0,10 has been used as limit to reject the null hypothesis.
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terms of wealth or historical circumstances of the implicated areas. As a matter 
of fact, as shown in the map of figure 2.2, we can say that: 
Figure 2.1  Plot between log GDP and GDP growth rate with respect to EU average  
(per capita variables).
• positive effects emerge in the historically richest areas of Europe: along the 
axis between Southern Germany and the Po Valley; in the Lower Rhine; in 
Southern England, around London and in the Spanish regions closer to the 
rest of Europe. Positive effects are also present in areas corresponding to big 
metropolitan  centres  especially  if  they  are  country  capitals:  this  often 
happens even in the poorer Eastern and Southern Europe;
• negative  effects  are  present  everywhere  in  Central  and Eastern  European 
Countries (CEECs) that joined the Union in 2004 and in 2007, including 
territories of the former German Democratic Republic; in the traditionally 
lagging  regions  by  the  Mediterranean  Sea;  in  Portugal;  in  the  marginal 
counties of United Kingdom; in the overseas territories and in some région in 
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the  north  of  France  as  well  as  in  Walloons,  the  french-speaking  part  of 
Belgium;
Figure 2.2  Map of regional fixed effects.
The extent of conditional convergence occurred between 1995 and 2007 can be 
detected through the observation of the compared boxplots of log per capita GDP of 
three different kinds of regions measured in initial and final year shown in figure 2.3. 
The easiest way to notice it is observing that,  after 12 years,  the three  distributions 
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seem  a bit more  concentrated  and that  their overlap is more limited. This is a clue of 
within-cluster convergence. Nevertheless it is remarkable that the downward whisker of 
the regions with negative fixed effects in 2007 is longer, as well as the upper box of the 
ones  with  positive  effects.  This  means  that,  even  in  a  framework  of  conditional 
convergence, is emerging an asymmetry of the distributions toward extreme values.
  
Figure 2.3   Boxplots comparison of log per capita GDP.
Borders of plots represents lower quartile, median and upper quartile; dots are outliers.
2.3 Factors Related to Fixed Effects
After the determination of the signs of the fixed effects for every region we are 
able to look at which factors they are related with and which form has the relation: these 
factors can then be the ones that  influence growth and push each region toward its 
steady state. 
Let us consider a causal chain according to which  y ≃ fei ∑
k
var i  y˙ i
where  fe  is the fixed effect of the  i-th region, the arrows mean causality,  var  is a 
group of  k  variables which influence the regional growth y˙ i . Assuming a functional 
form as:
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var i k = f  fei   [2.3] 
in table 2.2 there is a resume of the results of some important demographic variables, 
together  with  variables  referring  to  human  and  physical  capital.  Specifically,  table 
shows the signs of first and second derivatives (if significantly different from zero),  the 
average values for the three clubs of convergence and the F-statistic for assessing if 
there are significant differences in means depending on the group.
Table 2.2  Relations between fixed effects groups and characterising variables
Variables ∂var
∂ fe
∂2var
∂ fe2
F test Negativ
e fixed 
effects 
(96)
Close to 
0 fixed 
effects 
(106)
Positive 
fixed 
effects 
(62)
Demographic density + + 8.05 145 407 697
Rate of net migration + – 12.65 1.53 3.93 5.15
Life expectancy + – 47.15 75.2 78.2 78.4
% of university students + X 3.31 13.9 13.9 16.3
%  of  workers  in 
technological sectors
+ + 76.80 24.2 31.4 37.1
%  of  expenditure  in 
R&D
+ X 42.70 0.85 1.72 1.93
Per  capita  gross  fixed 
capital formation
+ + 134.40 2322 4194 5608
Rate of unemployment – X 65.60 12.5 7.3 5.5
Infrastructure per km2 + X 37.60 10.9 25.5 37.0
aaaaaa1 Symbols in columns of derivatives show which are the shapes of the fitted relations among 
the variables and the  absolute  size of  the fixed effects  (fe).  +  means derivative > 0,  –  means 
derivative < 0 and X means that quadratic relation is excluded.
aaaaaa2 F test shows the value of F-Snedecor statistics which measure average differences of the  
three groups through an ANOVA analysis. Critical value for F2,261, α=0,05 is 3,03.
aaaaaa3 Last three columns show the average values for each group with different magnitude of 
fixed effects.
We see that more urbanized areas are bound to converge to a higher level of per 
capita GDP, as well as the richest regions attract more workers coming from other areas 
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and are the ones which have better health conditions, measured  through proxy of life 
expectancy;  level  of  income  is  positively related  with  expenditures  in research  and 
development and fixed capital formation, which, according to the theory, are variables 
that should have a great impact on growth; very significant is  also the size and the 
direction of the relation with the percentage of workers in technological sectors – which 
are the sectors with higher value added and stronger propensity to innovation – and the 
inverse relation with the rate of unemployment that is an important cause of waste of 
human capital. With respect to propensity to study, we can observe that in richer regions 
propensity  to  study is  higher  for  tertiary  education  but  there  are  no  effects  on  the 
percentage of  people 15 to  24 years  old attending upper secondary education:  such 
result  could  appear  paradoxical,  since  more  financial  resources  should  push  young 
people to  continue  their  education  beyond what  is  compulsory,  however  it  must  be 
considered that when a region has higher level of income, young people tends more to 
abandon secondary school in order to take advantage of the circumstances, entering 
sooner in labour market. Although such choice guarantees immediate gains, this does 
not seem a good strategy in the long term, since unskilled workers are the weakest class 
in case of a slow down of the economy. Finally, richer regions are more endowed of 
infrastructures, which seem to be a precondition, also if not necessary, for growth.
Productive  structure  of  the  three  groups  does  not  differ  in  the  size  of  the 
industrial  sector,  whereas  differences  are  relevant  in  agriculture,  where  the  poorest 
regions have employed a higher percentage of workers, often in activities with very low 
value added, and the richest ones have employment at the minimum physiological level. 
Different structure is present also in services, which are more developed in regions with 
positive fixed effects, especially if we consider trade and financial services.
2.4  Country-Effects and Within-Country Disparities of Fixed Effects
Next  step  of  the  analysis  is  distinguish  between  those  states  which  show  a 
uniform pattern, that is where the  country-effect is very strong and influences in only 
one way the performance of every region, and the other nations which show, for various 
reasons, dual economies:
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• the country-effect predominates negatively in all the former communist places as 
well as in Greece and Portugal, whereas the only state with positive country-
effect is Netherlands;
• we can detect five countries where different regions seem to converge toward 
various steady state (the steady-state club toward which they converge, as said, 
depends on the magnitude of the regional fixed effect which is represented by 
the  height  of  the  bars  in  the  histograms.  Different  colours  indicate  different 
geographical or historical groups of regions inside the countries):  
I. this is the case of Germany whose unification has not completely solved the 
question  of  integration  between  East  and  West  which  had  opposite  destiny 
during more than 40 years. East is affected by high rate of unemployment and 
strong  emigration  (negative  balance  of  net  migration),  whereas  there  are  no 
differences in propensity to study and these are not relevant in the productive 
structure, even if sectors are different qualitatively speaking;
 
Figure 2.4  Histogram of fixed effects in some representative German Länder.
II. Italy,  whose  fixed  effects  are  represented  in  figure  2.5  –  the  most  classical 
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example of double or maybe triple development's speed – is a much graver case 
than Germany, since such problems have very deep historical roots and they are 
still  unsolved after 150 years since its unification. Here the sign of the fixed 
effects  is  not  related  with  demographic  density:  Italy  is  not  experiencing  a 
process  of urbanization,  but  just  the opposite,  since during the last  30 years 
population of the bigger municipalities has been diminishing relevantly, whereas 
the process of abandoning the countryside has arrived to an halt: Italy is indeed a 
positive example of satisfactory quality of life even in rural areas. Looking at the 
other  variables  we remark  that  differences  emerge  especially  among  regions 
with negative fixed effects (the “Mezzogiorno”) and the rest: the peculiarity with 
respect to EU average is the distribution of expenditures in R&D, on the whole 
very low, which is higher in regions with fixed effects close to 0 and not so 
different  between  the  richest  and  the  poorest  regions.  In  the  end  productive 
structure registers in the Mezzogiorno more workers in agriculture and in public 
sectors and less in industry;
Figure 2.5  Histogram of fixed effects of all Italian Regioni.
III. the same geographical situation as Italy, but with a less strong polarization can 
be found in Spain, where the old industrial northern regions keep on having an 
advantage especially over the Centre and the South. The patterns are not odd, 
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but it can be detected very low values in propensity to study, in human resources 
in  science  and  technology  and  in  expenditures  in  R&D.  Spain  has  also 
experienced a strong immigration with the same magnitude everywhere and the 
same intensity of growth in all the comunidades, regardless of the initial level of 
GDP. Spanish regional results in term of fixed effects are shown in figure 2.6;
Figure 2.6  Histogram of fixed effects of all Spanish Comunidades.
IV. United  Kingdom  shows  instead  a  visible  centre-peripheral  dualism.  Some 
missing values does not allows us to provide reliable descriptive statistics about 
education and migration. R&D and fixed capital formation are consistent with 
EU averages of the different kind of regions, except that, in UK, differences are 
stronger  between  regions  with  positive  fixed  effect  and  the  rest.  Productive 
structure differs mainly just in the size of financial sector, much higher in richer 
counties.  The  special  feature  of  this  country  is  that  there  are  no  significant 
differences among regions in term of productivity and unemployment and that 
even  if  we  exclude  the  outliers  values  of  Inner  London,  we  find  clues  of 
divergence which we did not find in countries previously analysed. The extent of 
the fixed effects registered in some representative British regions is shown in 
figure 2.7;
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Figure 2.7  Histogram of fixed effects in some representative British NUTS2 regions.
V. at last it is worth noting that in Belgium, whose situation is shown in figure 2.8,  
the  different  areas  correspond  with  the  linguistic  regions  of  Walloon  and 
Flanders with the former, the poorest, sensibly converging toward the same level 
than  the  bordering  French  zones  and  the  latter  approaching  itself  to  Dutch 
regions. This can be an emblematic element especially considering that here the 
secessionistic pressures perhaps have not ever been as strong as now.
Figure 2.8  Histogram of fixed effects of all Belgian provinces.
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 2.5  Conclusions
In short, a weak process of absolute convergence took place among European 
regions in the interval between 1995 and 2007. Up to 2001 non-conditional convergence 
is  nearly non-existent,  while  in  the second 6 years  the catching-up process is  more 
intense.  Models  testing for  conditional  β-convergence fit  better,  suggest  a  quite  fast 
approach  toward  the  steady state  of  every  region  and  reveal  the  existence  of  very 
various fixed effects. These effects are in many cases due to country factors, but there 
are remarkable exceptions, especially when the size of the state is bigger. What is clear 
is that, behind this pattern, a lot of regional peculiarities are hidden. Hence, it appears 
necessary to deepen the study of the different behaviours of  EU regions  beyond the 
conventional analysis.
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Regional Income Levels 
In the previous chapter we saw that European regions act in a very different way 
and this implies that their evolution, in terms of economic growth, differs remarkably: 
while there are areas which have grown very little, worsening their relative position, 
others have performed surprising well. 
In this chapter we will analyse the mobility of European regions through income 
classes using a Markovian system16. In section 1 we start the analysis by comparing 
what have been the distributions of per capita income at the beginning and at the end of 
the period, then we introduce Markovian systems and apply them to such variable. Once 
we have caught which are the dynamics, we are able to divide NUTS-2 in winners, 
losers and stable regions, according to the relative growth experienced and after some 
geographical considerations in section 2, we propose in section 3 a review of what could 
have been the explanatory factors of the economic growth measured with this method. 
Conclusions follows in section 4.
3.1  Income Distribution and Its Evolution through Time
Looking at the histograms of the frequencies in the various income classes (EU 
average = 100) represented in figure 3.1, we can appraise what steps toward European 
integration after mid-90s have meant for the improvement of EU cohesion in terms of 
wealth:  even  with  this  simple  tool  we  may point  out  the  trend  clearly:  the  second 
distribution has values around its average with higher frequencies and the left peak has 
almost disappeared.
However,  what  this  diagram  hides  is  the  contradictory  dynamism  that  EU 
NUTS-2 have experienced in those years.  They are not trapped in a fixed or stable 
16 A Markov chain is  the  characterization of  a  system that  transits  from one state  to  another,  in  a  
chainlike manner, with the basic property that the next state depends only on the current state and not 
on the past.
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position  within  an  European ranking:  on the  contrary,  remarkable  shifts  have  taken 
place. With regard to this, it must be said that upward and downward shifts are recorded 
in any kind of region, since both richer and poorer regions have performed positively or 
have shown negative dynamics.
Markovian  approach,  mainly  implemented  by  Quah,  allows  us  to  grasp 
satisfactorily the extent and the direction of the regional dynamics, enabling to split 
regions up in groups of winners or losers. Such partition is then the starting point for a 
further  analysis  tending  to  determine  which  factors  are  commonly  characterising 
regional performances.
Given the assumption that regional income levels follow a stochastic process, 
seven  different  classes  of  per  capita  GDP with  respect  to  EU  average  (=100)  are
Figure 3.1 Histograms of per capita income distributions (1995 and 2007).
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defined: < 50, 50-75, 75-90, 90-110, 110-125, 125-150 and >15017.  Then we calculate 
the vectors of probabilities at the beginning ( P t ) and at the end ( P tn ) of the 
period of  n years. Third,  transition matrices  M18 are filled  tabulating which regions 
remain in the same class and which ones shift from one state to another in the initial and 
final  year  of the period.  From an initial  situation at  time  t,  represented by the first 
vector,  the  probabilities  of  belonging  to  each  class  of  income  at  time  t+n can  be 
obtained by solving the following equation:
P tn=M
n∗P t   [3.1]  
The equilibrium or ergodic solution is calculate when  n∞ so that we are 
able to obtain a vector P*, which indicates the probability of resting at each level of 
income in the long term, independently from the initial situation. Obviously if central 
values of P* (corresponding to the classes around the average) are the highest, we are 
witnessing a process of convergence; on the contrary, if two or more peaks emerge, this 
means that we are observing a process of polarization.
Distributions of table 3.1 can be read as follows:
1. During the  years  1995-2001 the  final  vector  has  higher  frequencies  than the 
initial one in the three central classes and smaller probabilities for the external 
states. Taking the ergodic distribution, we can see a peak in the central class, 
where we find the modal value (1/3 of the regions) and the distribution also has 
a shape which looks like normal. Kurtosis is 2.91, however its mass is a bit more 
concentrated  in  the  lowest  levels  so  we  are  in  front  of  a  right-skewed 
distribution. 
17 This partition is considered adequate to perceive in the best possible way the changes.  Considering  
Objective 1 areas (less than 75% of EU average) just in a class would not permit to note the evolution  
of many CEEC's regions. Obviously with any other arbitrary partition results would be different.
18 Transition  matrix  must  fulfil  the  condition  of  homogeneity,  irreducibility,  recurrence  and  lack  of 
periodicity  in  order  to  obtain  results  that  are  stationary,  hence  allowing a  long  term equilibrium 
solution (Artis et al. 1995).
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2. Considering data  of  the second period,  the modifications between initial  and 
final frequencies are more controversial: in 2007 the probability to be in the 50-
75 class is bigger than in 2001 whereas the probability to fall  in the central 
interval from 90 to 110 has decreased. The result, for these years, is that regions 
have limiting probabilities which are almost uniformly distributed among the 
three classes going from 50% of EU average to 110%; modal value, here, falls in 
the class 75-90; the distribution is more skewed to the right than the previous 
one and it has no more normal-like shape. In this interval there is also the case of 
Guyane  (overseas  territory  of  France)  that  goes  down  in  the  lowest  class, 
circumstance not happened before.
3. Looking at  the distributions  of the whole period we see that,  after  12 years, 
frequencies  have  increased  in  all  the  classes  from 50% to  125% of  the  EU 
average. These lead to an ergodic distribution which presents 1/4 of the regions 
with an income level lesser than 75%; almost uniform values (0.2855) in the 
classes 75-90 and 90-110 (but density is higher in the former, since the range is 
smaller) and just 1/6 of the regions with a per capita GDP bigger than 110.
Hence the results obtained show a very poor convergence, but the situation is not 
so clear and some considerations need to be made:
1. The  process  of  convergence  is  very  slow  considering  that  the  number  of 
necessary steps to obtain the limiting probabilities is 30 and even if  after  10 
steps the distributions are similar, reaching a very low degree of convergence 
would still take 60 years. Moreover, convergence is particularly worse during 
the second lag of years: this is a result which extremely contrasts with what has 
been found through regressions made using the traditional model. Hence, what 
has taken place, according to Markovian analysis, is a slowing down process of 
convergence:  this  seems  due  to  the  stronger  persistence  in  the  same classes 
experienced in  the  second sub-period  by the  regions  above the  EU average, 
while mobility actually increased only for the poorest regions (<50). 
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3.1  INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND ITS EVOLUTION THROUGH TIME
Table 3.1 Transition dynamics.
    Period 1                                                      1995-2001
< 50 50-75 75-90 90-110 110-125 125-150 > 150
< 50 0.949 0.051
50-75 0.800 0.171 0.029
75-90 0.105 0.737 0.158
90-110 0.131 0.672 0.197
110-125 0.364 0.477 0.159
125-150 0.088 0.353 0.441 0.118
> 150 0.250 0.750
Initial distr. 0.144 0.129 0.140 0.225 0.162 0.125 0.074
Final distr. 0.137 0.125 0.155 0.247 0.166 0.100 0.070
Ergodic 
distribution 0.000 0.137 0.260 0.343 0.170 0.061 0.029
 
   Period 2                                                      2001-2007
< 50 50-75 75-90 90-110 110-125 125-150 > 150
< 50 0.757 0.243
50-75 0.029 0.824 0.118 0.029
75-90 0.143 0.714 0.143
90-110 0.194 0.716 0.090
110-125 0.244 0.644 0.089 0.022
125-150 0.370 0.556 0.074
> 150 0.158 0.842
Initial distr. 0.137 0.125 0.155 0.247 0.166 0.100 0.070
Final distr. 0.107 0.159 0.173 0.244 0.166 0.081 0.070
Ergodic 
distribution
0.034 0.279 0.287 0.254 0.093 0.028 0.026
    Whole interval                                            1995-2007
< 50 50-75 75-90 90-110 110-125 125-150 > 150
< 50 0.718 0.256 0.026
50-75 0.029 0.771 0.114 0.086
75-90 0.158 0.579 0.263
90-110 0.328 0.508 0.115 0.033 0.016
110-125 0.386 0.455 0.136 0.023
125-150 0.029 0.118 0.500 0.235 0.118
> 150 0.050 0.300 0.650
Initial distr. 0.144 0.129 0.140 0.225 0.162 0.125 0.074
Final distr. 0.107 0.159 0.173 0.244 0.166 0.081 0.070
Ergodic 
distribution
0.023 0.233 0.286 0.285 0.104 0.045 0.035
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2. Mobility is more frequent among regions with levels of income above average 
than among those ones with lower per capita GDP. Such detail  can be noted 
looking at the values along the main diagonal of the transition matrices, which 
show the rates of persistence. In particular, only 23.5% of the regions that in 
1995 were in the range 125-150 still stayed in the same level 12 years later: 
more than 60% of them had fall down in lower classes. The opposite happened 
in the specular class, ranging from 50 to 75: during the same years 77.1% of the 
regions remained in the that interval and just 20% of them changed to upper 
levels.
3. Even if lagging regions have generally experienced improvement, at the end of 
the period 67 of them have remained below the 75% threshold of EU income 
average. Nevertheless, only 16 of these regions have had an economic growth 
lesser than European average. It is the case of Northern Bulgaria, eastern regions 
of Czech Republic,  some Greek and Hungarian rural  areas and Calabria  and 
Norte (Portugal) in Western Europe. These are really the most losers among the 
lagging  regions  and  such  situations  should  arise  worries  about  the  deep 
structural nature of their underdevelopment.
4. 122 regions experienced mobility and 149 had stability, hence the overall rate of 
persistence  is  0.55,  which  is  high  enough  to  say  that,  even  if  the  mobility 
phenomenon is relevant, there were not revolutionary changes in the regional 
ranking,  considered  also  that  only  4.8%  of  the  regions  moved  to  a  non-
contiguous  state.  Moreover,  as  introduced  before,  the  degree  of  mobility  is 
higher in the first period (0.32 versus 0.28).
3.2 Geographical patterns of economic growth
After having read and statistically interpreted the tables showing the main results 
of Markov chains  applied to  dynamics  of European regions,  it  is  very important  to 
consider  the  outcome  under  a  geographical  point  of  view:  spatial  distribution  and  
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Figure 3.2 Map of winning and losing regions.
direction of mobility can be seen in figure 3.2.
What appears immediately are the dominant country effects: in fact there are 
only two nations  which have regions  showing movement in  both directions:  United 
Kingdom and Greece. Besides it is worth to remark that:
1. All the CEECs have all their regions with non-negative movements and at least 
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an  area  which  has  experienced  upward  shift.  In  these  countries  the  better 
performances  have  been  carried  out  by  the  territories  of  the  capitals,  with 
Bratislava, Bucharest and Budapest protagonists even of double/triple jumps. 
2. Although the relative situation in East Germany is better than in the territories of 
West,  it  has  not  followed  the  positive  performances  of  the  other  former 
communist  countries  and  the  movement  of  the  capital,  Berlin,  stands  out 
negatively. The former German Democratic Republic did a different path than 
the  other  eastern  nations:  here  there  was  the  influence  of  what  Boldrin  and 
Canova19 call  the Big Brother Effect, that is the protection of the big Western 
Germany  which  tried  to  help  the  East  during  its  transition  through  income 
support  policies  and  abundant  subsidies  to  firms.  Besides,  since  its  regions 
joined the European Community almost 15 years before than CEECs, they could 
also  take  advantage  of  the  Community  Structural  Fund.  Growth  was  rapid 
during the first years after unification, but it slowed down already in the second 
half of 90s and the overall performance was quite mediocre. Remembering that, 
anyway,  East  Germany  is  nowadays  much  richer  than  the  other  former 
communist countries, we might say that these latter are experiencing now the 
boost  due  to  integration  which  it  saw  before,  but,  for  the  above-mentioned 
authors, differences are not only temporal, but especially in terms of quality of 
investment  (mainly in construction for  former GDR whereas  they have been 
directed to the most productive sectors at least in the most successful countries, 
like Hungary, Slovenia, Poland and Slovakia).
 
3. The core of  the Old Europe – the six founders plus Austria – shows everywhere 
non-positive movements, with the only exception of Netherlands (it was already 
one of the richest country and in 2007 it was ranked third). This is consistent 
with the relative decline of many old industrialised areas, like Rhine Valley and 
it makes positive performances of Southeastern England even more remarkable. 
Movements  to  a  lower  state  are  especially  intense  and  extended  in  Italy, 
19 Regional policies and EU enlargement, 2002.
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involving  84%  of  its  population:  the  missing  growth  is  particularly  grave 
considering the size of debt of this country. Its relative impoverishment had a 
strong acceleration since 2001 and such situation makes Italy the big sick of 
Europe.
4. In  Western  Europe  positive  trend  are  registered  in  Ireland  and  in  the  most 
Spanish  comunidades.  These  two  countries  are  two  emblematic  and  very 
different examples of growth: there are differences in the size of their population 
(4 millions versus 45 millions); in temporal evolution of their income; but also 
in the way they have promoted their development. This is an elements which we 
will have something to say later about. 
3.3  Explanatory Factors of  Per Capita GDP Growth
In this section we try to investigate which characteristics have been relevant for 
EU regions growth, that is finding some common elements for each group of  winning, 
stationary or losing regions – which differentiate it from the other groups – in order to 
discover some explanatory factors of regional mobility observed.
3.3.1 Description of Variables
To explore these possible factors we have chosen some variables which a priori 
should have some influence on per  capita  GDP evolution of NUTS-2.  The variable 
selected are described in the following sections20.
 
3.3.1.1 Population
• fertility is used to capture one of the dynamics of natural growth of population 
and to some extent it is expected to be negatively related to movement across 
classes of income.
• demographic density is used as a proxy for urbanization level and it should be 
higher for the winners since we have seen the tendency toward concentration of 
economic activities in metropolitan areas.
20 Sometimes proxies are used because of the lack of more adequate series.
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• migration is a way to measure the attractiveness of an area for the human factor: 
labour  mobility  is  analogous  to  capital  mobility  and  it  differs  from natural 
changes  in  population  because  it  has  repercussions  both  on  source  and 
destination  territory  and  because  immigrants,  unlike  newborns,  are  persons 
which are already endowed with some skill. Net migration is certainly higher for 
the richest regions since it should basically depends on the expected wage, but 
behaviour should not follow a clear pattern if we consider mobility across levels 
of income as discriminant and if we remember that it has also a negative effect 
on per capita GDP through swelling of  population.
• life expectancy, which is a variable representative of the health conditions of the 
regions,  should  be  higher  for  richer  slowing  down  regions.  Furthermore  it 
proxies  for  features  that  reflect  desirable  performance of  a  society,  as  better 
work habits. 
3.3.1.2 Production 
• inserting initial and final per capita GDP has the purpose of assessing which are 
the income conditions for each group: it is expected to find a bigger value for 
losers and smaller for winners, according to the findings about convergence, but 
we do not have any a priori ideas about the final distribution.
• GDP total  growth rates and of every sub-period have been chosen to capture 
differences in regional trends. These variables will result obviously related with 
the classes, hence the true aim of inserting them in the analysis is seeing what 
are the sizes of these differences among groups and checking if they have the 
same significant magnitudes in each sub-period.
• Gross value added growth measures evolution in productivity which should be 
related directly with regional performances.
3.3.1.3 Human Capital, R&D and Fixed Capital
• three  human capital  indicators,  in  terms of  education,  have  been taken:  they 
show  population  percentages  (25-64  years  old)  by  educational  level:  lower 
secondary, upper secondary and tertiary education attainment.
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• percentage of human resources employed in scientific and technological sectors;
percentage  of  expenditures  in  research  and  development21 to  measure  the 
regional effort for innovation and higher productivity.
• gross fixed capital formation (per capita) has its own worthiness to show the 
pattern of economic growth and especially the degree confidence of investors, 
since they will choose investment in fixed assets only if forecasts are good for 
long-term22. Besides it is also a proxy for investment and, since it is per capita, it 
should have some connection with the disposable capital per worker too.
The growth of all these variables, according to theory, should have a positive 
influence over the income level of a territory.
3.3.1.4 Production Structure
• The allocation of workers in sectors as their growth rate have crucial importance 
on the evolution of productivity, and hence of economic performances. In the 
analysis we have used both initial and final size of the sectors and their growth 
during  the  years  from  1995  to  2007.   We  have  not  taken  in  consideration 
traditional three-sectorial partition, but a distinction among agriculture, industry,  
construction, trade, finance and real estate and public sector. This because we 
think that  such partition allows a better  interpretation of  the phenomenon of 
growth in the various EU regions. Moreover, depending on which sector growth 
is based on, it might be more or less weak, more or less lasting.
• Employment growth is used as control variables.
3.3.2 Empirical Results
The method used is a statistical contrast among average differences through an 
ANOVA analysis.  Regions  have  been  divided  into  three  groups:  those  ones  which 
21 These data are available at NUTS-1 level. 
22 In  times of economic uncertainty or  recession, typically business investment in fixed assets will  be 
reduced, since it ties up additional capital for a longer interval of time, with a risk that it will not pay 
itself off . Conversely, in times of robust economic growth, fixed investment will increase across the 
board, because the observed market expansion makes it likely that such investment will be profitable in 
the future. 
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moved upward; those ones which moved downward and regions that did not experience 
changes in the period considered. Table 3.2 summarises the averages of the supposed 
causal  variables  for  each  class  and  the  Fisher-Snedecor  tests  to  assess  if  there  are 
significant differences in means depending on the groups. 
Obviously results would be different if we tested different partitions of regions, 
for instance the winners and the rest or the losers and the rest: in order to detect deeper 
information,  for  relevant  variables,  pairwise  comparisons  through  Tukey  HSD 
(Honestly Significant Difference) tests have been executed and they are shown in table 
3.3.
What we can see immediately from table 3.2 is that variables strictly related with 
population,  as  fertility  and  density,  are  not  explanatory  factors  of  the  observed 
differences  among  the  groups  selected,  whereas   migration  is  U-shaped  with  no 
significant difference between winners and losers and we can say that it follows well 
enough the pattern of final per capita GDP, hence, ex ante, the expected income.
Health conditions, which are significant, are better for losers and not different 
for the other two groups: they are related with the initial GDP level but result could be 
also consistent with historical facts that registers worse states of health during processes 
of economic development.
Initial per capita GDP is noticeably higher for losers, about 4000 Euros more 
than for the other two group, which have actually the same starting condition. Then the 
process reduces disparities, which are quite slight among groups in 2007, and leave the 
central group of not-moving regions back. 
The analysis of GDP growth, instead, does not reveal any interesting pattern. 
Differences are significant among every group and are present in both sub-periods, with 
the latter in which groups experienced higher rates.
Among variables representing educational levels, the hypothesis that the number 
of persons who attained at most lower secondary education is the same in every class 
cannot be rejected. Hence differences among winning regions and the rest emerge in 
middle and high educational levels: winners show a higher share of persons who are 
high – skilled  and,   as  consequence,  a  lower  population  percentage  with  just  upper 
48
3.3  EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF  PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH
Table 3.2 Relations between characterising variables and growth performances.
Variables Statistics tests Average values
F test p-value Downward
(73)
Stable
(149)
Upward
(49)
Fertility 2.74 0.664 1.52 1.53 1.42
Demographic density 0.63 0.532 283 373 463
Migration 7.48 0.000 3.90 2.29 5.16
Life expectation 11.32 0.000 78.4 76.5 76.8
Per capita GDP 1995 12.74 0.000 17048 13487 12627
Per capita GDP 2007 3.25 0.040 25289 22771 26018
GDP average growth 1995-2001 149.91 0.000 3.69 4.83 6.98
GDP average growth 2001-2007 64.08 0.000 4.11 5.01 7.36
GDP average growth 1995-2007 63.43 0.000 3.27 4.67 6.61
Low education 0.78 0.462 33.92 32.28 35.78
Mid education  3.54 0.030 45.86 47.24 39.88
High education 3.77 0.024 19.00 18.78 22.41
Workers in technological sectors 5.32 0.005 30.87 28.65 32.88
Expenditures in R&D 4.30 0.014 1.69 1.38 1.23
Gross fixed capital formation 5.83 0.003 4436 3571 3653
Agriculture employment 1995 9.83 0.000 5.27 11.82 7.98
Agriculture employment 2007 11.28 0.000 3.83 8.49 4.88
Agriculture employment growth 1.49 0.228 -19.37 -12.88 -27.52
Industry employment 1995 3.48 0.032 22.68 20.04 20.60
Industry employment 2007 0.82 0.441 18.54 17.72 16.92
Industry employment growth 5.79 0.003 -17.70 -11.38 -17.93
Constructions employment 1995 1.86 0.157 7.20 7.33 8.03
Constructions employment 2007 27.57 0.000 7.19 7.64 10.09
Constr. employment growth 10.18 0.000 1.41 12.35 29.02
Trade employment 1995 1.93 0.147 24.93 24.43 26.06
Trade employment 2007 2.59 0.077 24.79 24.95 26.45
Trade employment growth 2.57 0.078 -0.13 4.47 2.68
Finance employment 1995 1.60 0.203 10.10 9.29 10.54
Finance employment 2007 2.83 0.061 13.60 11.83 13.14
Finance employment growth 1.42 0.243 35.47 30.33 31.25
Public employment 1995 4.36 0.014 30.16 27.40 27.11
Public employment 2007 5.07 0.007 32.06 29.38 28.51
Public employment growth 2.12 0.121 6.70 9.33 5.75
GVA average growth 60.30 0.000 1.77 2.76 4.17
Employment average growth 9.28 0.000 0.60 0.51 1.21
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Table 3.3 Significance of the differences across group.
Variables Comparisons
Not change – 
Down
Up – Downward Up – Not Change
Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
Migration -1.61 0.052 1.26 0.334 2.87 0.001
Life expectation -1.84 0.000 -1.62 0.005 0.23 0.871
Per capita GDP 1995 -3561 0.000 -4421 0.000 -860 0.616
Per capita GDP 2007 -2518 0.133 729 0.902 3247 0.081
Mid education 1.38 0.834 -5.98 0.134 -7.36 0.023
High education -0.22 0.980 3.41 0.066 3.64 0.021
Workers in technological sectors -2.22 0.150 2.02 0.388 4.23 0.006
Expenditure in R&D -0.32 0.049 -0.47 0.020 -0.15 0.585
Gross fixed capital formation -866 0.003 -783 0.052 -82 0.959
Agriculture employment 1995 6.55 0.000 2.71 0.352 3.84 0.740
Agriculture employment 2007 2.17 0.000 -2.18 0.724 -6.49 0.009
Industry employment 1995 -2.64 0.025 -2.09 0.246 0.55 0.882
Industry employment growth 6.33 0.012 0.23 0.996 6.56 0.028
Construction employment 2007 0.44 0.354 2.90 0.000 2.46 0.000
Constr. employment growth 10.95 0.056 27.61 0.000 16.67 0.007
GVA average growth 0.98 0.000 2.40 0.000 1.41 0.000
Employment average growth -0.10 0.776 0.61 0.003 0.70 0.000
secondary education. Values of tertiary educational level confirm that human capital is a 
very relevant factor which we must consider in order to explain economic growth and 
having more persons with high education is a very positive factor to  stimulate it.
The same remark can be made about percentage of workers in scientific and 
technological sectors (that stimulate productions with higher value added),  which, in 
fact,  is directly related with growth performances. Nevertheless level of expenditure in 
Research & Development, which is higher for losers and lower for winners, is an alarm 
that  should  push  operators  and  administrators  of  winning  regions  to  change  their 
policies if they want to support a long-lasting growth. The suspicion that, in some way, 
GDP growth experienced by regions which moved upward is not so solid is confirmed 
by gross  fixed  capital  formation  which,  as  said  before,  it  can  be  interpreted  as  an 
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indicator of operators' confidence: it is significantly higher for losers, hence agents have 
preferred to direct  their  fixed investments toward old industrialised zones that,  to  a 
certain extent, still seem more reliable.
If  we  move  on  production  structure  we  first  see  a  generalised  decrease  of 
employment in agriculture which leaves unchanged the relative positions of our groups, 
with winners and losers showing a similar level, lower than that one of not-changing 
regions:  this  is  not  surprising  since areas  that  moved downward were  industrialised 
since long time and areas that moved upward are basically urban areas, in contrast with 
rural areas which did not experience any significant change in their income.
Employment  in  industry,  which  at  the  beginning  was  obviously  higher  in 
European Core Area, has fallen down (less for not-changing regions) and, in 2007, has 
differences among groups that are no more significant.
3.3.2.1  Role of Constructions Sector
The very relevant variable is indeed employment in constructions: percentages 
were no significantly different in 1995, but then three classes have had opposite patterns 
in their evolution: losing regions have seen a slight decrease in the relative weight of 
this sector; not-changing regions have on average registered an increase of 12%  while 
in winning regions the proportion of workers in constructions rises up to more than 
10%, with a net increase of almost 30%.  Hence, in 2007, employment in constructions 
is still not statistically different between areas that moved downward and areas which 
remained stable, but it is much higher for areas that had a positive movement. Looking 
at figure 3.3, representing the intensity of changes in such sector, we can observe that, 
even  within winners, behaviours have been very different: Baltic states on average have 
doubled the size; increase has not been so important in the other CEECs, whereas it is  
easy  too  see  that  the  only  country  that  was  able  to  grow,  decreasing  the  share  of 
constructions,  has  been  Netherlands.  We  should  consider  that  former  communist 
nations, in their transition period, needed in some way to be rebuilt, but this is not true  
for Spain and Ireland (where maybe there were necessity just for infrastructures): these 
two  cohesion  countries  which  experienced  respectively  a  strong  growth  and  an 
economic miracle show everywhere big increases in construction up to 136% of La 
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Rioja and 96% of the Irish area not including the capital (Dublin area growth is 71%). 
Not less emblematic is the performance of one of European regions historically more 
affected by unemployment: Andalucía with more than 60%. This production structure 
analysis  makes  arise  a  strong  suspicion  that   many  winners  have  based  their 
performance in sectors, as  constructions, that cannot be the basis of a strong productive 
system able to promote economic growth in a long term23. This is confirmed by what 
has happened after 2007: problems due to property bubbles have caused recession in 
Ireland and a halt in Spain with a dramatic growth in unemployment and even Baltic 
nations have registered worse performances than the other CEECs24
Figure 3.3 Growth of construction employment in winning regions.
Other sectors do not show different patterns in three groups: it is registered a 
substantial stability in trade employment, a strong increase in finance, and a slighter 
growth in public sector, but such evolutions do not alter the relative positions of the 
23 Investments  in  constructions (infrastructure)  are often a precondition of  episodes of  extraordinary 
economic growth, but it seems that this does not alter the long-run growth rate of the regions involved 
in any signiﬁcant way, if they do not go with improvement in more long-lasting sectors of production.
24 Of course these crises must be analysed in the global crisis context, but not for such reason they must  
not be seen in their essence and in their bigger graveness and heaviness.
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classes.
3.3.2.2 Productivity and Employment
Finally, productivity evolution has a basic role in explaining the various levels of 
growth shown by the groups:  regional  GVA growth differences  are  very strong and 
Tukey HSD test provides clear results: winning regions have had higher productivity 
growth rates whereas losers, although in all cases but one (Severozapaden, Bulgaria) 
register positive performances, show lower rates than the other two classes. 
Moreover,  this variable has a greater influence in the long term evolution of 
regional income.  Under this point of view it is possible to point out some common 
behaviour patterns for winning as well as for losing regions: most of the former (45 over 
49) shows productivity gains above average: 25 of them have had a completely virtuous 
behaviour showing also employment growth above average, whereas other 20 register 
income growth probably due to restructuring processes (employment  growth under the 
average); the situation is reversed if we look at losing regions where 58 over 73 show 
GVA rates under average: besides, 25 of them have experienced a more serious situation 
of economic decline, with both productivity and employment under European average. 
A resume of these last results is shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Evolution of productivity and employment in winning and losing regions.
Downward (73) Upward (49)
Higher GVA and employment 2 3% 25 51%
Higher GVA, lower employment 13 18% 20 41%
Lower GVA, higher employment 33 45% 3 6%
Lower GVA and employment 25 34% 1 2%
3.4  Conclusions
The  strong  growth  of  some  lagging  regions  and  the  average  acceptable 
performances of many Eastern regions, together with the relative decline of most of the 
core areas  are  facts  which have promoted convergence;  on the contrary the relative 
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stagnation  of  many  old  peripheral  regions,  which  have  not  solved  their  historical 
disadvantages (as the Italian Mezzogiorno, Greek, Portuguese and Bulgarian regions), 
together  with the  increased  concentration  of  economic activities  in  big urban areas, 
mainly country's capitals, have promoted stagnation or divergence. The total result, as 
shown by analysis of Markov chains for the two sub-periods, is a slowdown of the weak 
process of convergence among EU regions. Convergence which, analysed with this tool 
too, indeed appears clearly as a conditioned process. 
Considering  the  variables  that  can  have  influenced growth,  human resources 
play a very important and positive role in explaining the observed regional mobility, 
whereas we cannot say the same about the quality and the size of capital investments 
which show here almost an inverse relation with economic growth. This is an important 
finding  to  take  into  account  that  surely  has  had  many  repercussions  on  regional 
performances in  the years following this  research.  Evolution of productive structure 
underlines that the main changes in it, the decrease of agriculture and industry and the 
increase  of  finance,  have  had a  similar  impact  everywhere,  whereas  significant  and 
different changes occurred in constructions are the ones that could explain better the 
regional  mobility,  with  the  implication  that  this  involves.  We  finally  remark  the 
fundamental role of productivity growth, more than employment growth to explain great 
part of regional gains and losses.
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country and Within-country Components
In  this  chapter,  in  order  to  analyse  regional  convergence,  we  come  back  to 
traditional  tools  of  regional  scientists,  which  have  been  lately  abandoned  in  more 
sophisticated  analyses  carried  out  by  macroeconomists.  To  do  this,  we  separate 
momentarily the study of regional convergence from that of economic growth and we 
will  use Theil  Index to  measure inequalities.  We first  introduce such index,  then in 
section 2 we analyse its evolution and its decomposition considering different level of 
spatial aggregation (community,  national and regional).  In section 3 it is proposed a 
different and transversal spatial framework and the findings about it. Conclusions are 
presented in section 4.
4.1 Introduction to Theil Index
Many researches25 detect a trade-off between regional and national convergence 
and  suggest  that,  in  European  Union,  path  toward  convergence  is  characterised  by 
increasing  disparities  among  regions  within  the  various  countries,  that  is  total 
convergence is due to the bigger cohesion registered among countries, achieved mainly 
paying the cost of more inequalities inside them.
To investigate on this hypothesis, in the traditional current of spatial analysis 
about inequality, we choose Theil Index of concentration: various authors have shown 
the  merits  of  this  index  applied  to  spatial  distributions,  among  which  there  are  its 
weighting  system,  its  decomposibility  and  its  independence  from  the  number  of 
observations, features particularly useful in a context as heterogeneous as the NUTS2 
and in a Union formed both by regions and states of very different sizes. 
Theil index is calculated according to the following formula26:
25 See for example Duro (2001).
26 Theil index is an absolute value. It is possible to bound it between zero and one in order to obtain a  
relative coefficient of heterogeneity dividing it by the upper bound calculated by taking the natural  
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T=∑
i=1
r
y i log  y i / pi    [4.1]  
where  T  is total inequality among the   r  regions,  yi   and  pi  are regional shares of 
European GDP measured in million of PPS and population respectively27.
Total  inequality  can  then  be  disaggregated  in  between-country  and  within-
country components as suggested by Molle and associates (1980):
T=T bcT wc   [4.2]  
where:
T bc=∑
i=1
c
Y c log Y c/Pc   [4.3]
T wc=∑
i=1
c
Y c[∑i=1
r  yrY clog yrpr PcY c ]   [4.4] 
Capital letters mean here the  c  country shares of EU income and population.
4.2  Empirical results
Figure 4.1 shows the time series values of Theil Index for three different sets of 
data corresponding to subsequent phases of enlargement that EU experienced in the 
period from 1995 to 2007. We can hence observe what degree of disparity there was in 
former EU15 including countries of Western Europe; the change in the index due to the 
entries of 10 CEECs countries in 2004 and finally due to the inclusion of Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007. In this way we can follow each group of countries from the entry year  
until the end of the period: this allows to concentrate our attention on the effects of 
logarithm of income, however to our purposes it is not fundamental.
27 A dual  form  also  exists,  where  income  and  population  shares  are  interchanged,  but  here  it  is 
appropriate to weight the contribution of each region to inequality by its economic rather than by its 
demographic strenght.
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integration process on regional convergence.
Figure 4.1  Evolution of Theil Index during different stages of EU integration.
According  to  Theil  Index,  regional  inequality  in  EU15  remained  basically 
constant during the whole period: there are some very slight phases of increasing and 
decreasing disparities, but long term trend is clearly stationary. We might argue that the 
15 countries that were already together in 1995 had previously reached an equilibrium 
in terms of regional inequality.
In  2004,  when  CEECs10  joined  the  Union,  the  total  index  had  a  dramatic 
increase,  but  since  then  the  trend  of  EU25  has  been  toward  convergence  with  an 
equilibrium that does not seem near, considering that the rate of reduction of  T  has not  
been slowing down. 
Finally, in 2007, a new consistent increase was registered: observing that regions 
which entered were only 14 over a number of 257 in EU25, we can realize the great  
extent of the different levels of income present in Romania and Bulgaria.
From  this  initial  analysis  we  can  conclude  that   EU  regional  convergence, 
occurred in the last years, seems basically determined by the entry of the less developed 
former communist countries28.
28 Also Malta and Cyprus (NUTS-2 corresponding to NUTS-0) pertain to the group of CEECs despite 
their different locations. Besides they were not part of the communist block, but you will forgive this  
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4.2.1 Central and Eastern European Countries
We observe what happened in these countries by watching at figure 4.2 which 
shows  evolution  of  Theil  Index  since  1995  considering  them  alone  and  its 
decomposition.
Figure 4.2  Evolution and decomposition of CEECs Theil Index.
Changes in these countries were many and of relevant size:
1. After  the  end  of  communism,  inequalities  among  CEECs  increased  rapidly, 
registered a halt  around the year 2000 and then took the opposite path toward 
less disparities with an accelerated trend especially after 2004, when most of 
them joined EU.
2. A very different pattern is shown by the within-country index which is relatively 
stationary and quite low until 2004 and then had a strong impulse of constant 
growth that had not finished yet at the end of the period considered. This is the 
first clue that pushes toward the assertion according to which the participation in 
imprecision if you consider their modest weights in terms of population and GDP over all the regions 
that lately entered in the Union.
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the EU causes increasing disparities within its countries.
3. The total result is affected by the two components in a various way: between-
country component has been predominating during all  the period but the last 
year,  when  there  was  the  overtake  of  within-inequalities.  Path  toward 
convergence among these regions that started in the new century was interrupted 
only  during  one  year,  but  with  such  a  growth  of  within-country  index, 
convergence is not very fast. Nevertheless, considered the small size of almost 
all  these  countries  (a  remarkable  exception  is  Poland  and  to  a  lesser  extent 
Romania) we could claim that the main attention should be paid to between-
country inequalities and, according to this, be a bit more satisfied in terms of 
convergence.
4.2.2  EU15
If we move to EU15, what we can see, as shown in figure 4.3, is very different, 
since the situation of equilibrium of total  T  reached is the result of a predominant 
effect of the within-country index and very low disparities among countries. Moreover, 
variations in the two components occurred only in the first half of the period considered 
and were not so strong as for the CEECs, but the direction was again toward a growth of 
inequalities  within-country,  compensated  by  a  decrease  in  the  between-country 
component. For these countries, the most of which joined European Monetary Union 
(EMU), it seems that this happening has stopped not only the variations of total Theil 
which was already still, but especially the modification in its composition.
4.2.3 EU27 area
The joined effects of inequalities in CEECs and EU15 are shown in figure 4.4, 
where it is  represented the evolution of total  T  and its decomposition referred to all the 
regions that today are taking part in EU27. A resume of the most significant results is 
highlighted in table 4.1.
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Figure 4.3  Evolution and decomposition of EU15 Theil Index.
1. Between-country inequality had the most important role in 1995, contributing to 
total Theil for 67%. Its value had been already decreasing very slightly in the 
late 90s, but after 2000 negative trend, with a uniform speed, started to be more 
substantial.
Figure 4.4  Evolution and decomposition of Theil Index (EU27 area).
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2. Within-country inequality, on the contrary, has slightly been growing up every 
year up to 2001, from 0.0312 to 0.0369, then has been remaining stationary in 
the second part of the period considered.
3. The joined effect shows a pattern of total Theil which oscillates between 0.093 
and 0.095 in the first 6 years: this is the constant result of the slight decrease and 
increase of respectively  Tbc  and  Twc ; then the value falls to 0.0741, according to 
the diminution of between-country inequality, since the within-country did not 
register relevant movements. 
4. In terms of composition, the importance of  Tbc , which was double than  Twc  at 
the beginning, diminished to 1.5 times in 2001, at the end of the first sub-period 
characterised by opposite slight movements, and dropped toward parity in the 
second sub-period, with a significant overtake of within-country inequality in 
2007 due, however, not to an its own increase.
Table 4.1  Values of total and decomposed T.
Year T T 
between-
country
T 
within-
country
Between
Total 
Within
Total
1995 0.0949 0.0637 0.0312 0.671 0.392
2001 0.0933 0.0564 0.0369 0.605 0.395
2007 0.0741 0.0365 0.0376 0.492 0.508
In conclusion, the entry of CEECs and the effectiveness of EMU had the effect 
of  reducing  disparities  among  countries.  Inside  the  countries,  inequalities  grew 
limitedly, but significantly if we consider it in relative terms. The hypothesis according 
to which all the convergence among the regions at European level is explained by the 
convergence among countries cannot be rejected. With respect to the direction of the 
inequality within the countries, more light can be shed on the issue looking at what 
happened inside the biggest European states.
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4.2.4 Cases of within-country inequalities
In  figure  4.5  it  can  be  seen  the  evolution  of  Theil  Index inside  the  big  six 
countries which in 2007 represented 70% of EU population and 73% of its income. We 
have added also Belgium which, as we have seen in section 2.4, in spite of being small, 
has political problems due to its dual economy. 
Results about inequality calculated with this index confirm some fact commonly 
known,  but  at  the  same  time  they  reveal  some  situation  or  evolution  a  bit  more 
surprising: looking at the levels we find that Belgian disparities are very high relatively 
to  the country size and even if  in  the last  years  they have decreased,  they are still 
important. The most inequal among the big 6 is the United Kingdom where the richest 
region – Inner London – has its per capita income about 4 times higher than the poorest, 
Cornwall. Then, as expected, there is Italy. In 1995 the three countries we have just 
mentioned had high inequalities, then there were France, Germany and Spain with a 
similar medium degree of inequality and finally Poland with a satisfactory homogeneity 
among its regions, probably an heritage of the previous regime. Then, during the period 
considered we have been witnessing a constant increment of  inequality within  the UK 
that in 2007  had grown of more than 50% with respect to 1995. The same trend, but 
less constant,  is shown by Poland,  which,  with market economy,  experienced almost a 
Figure 4.5  Inequalities within-country of Big 6 and Belgium.
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triplication of its regional disparities. On the contrary, we can observe a better situation 
in Italy,  due mainly to a strong relative impoverishment of the north and not to the 
growth  performances  of  Mezzogiorno,  which,  actually,  have  been  quite  mediocre. 
France is instead a particular case, since all of its inequality is due to the income of its 
capital city, without which the country would be an example of minimum disparities. 
Germany after the unification process, which gave initially a strong impulse toward 
convergence has not registered any further improvement after 1995. Finally Spain, that 
experienced a growth of inequality in the first sub-period, changed its trend and, in the 
last years considered, the value of Theil Index is stationary around 0.02, similar to the 
initial value, which allows the Iberian nation to be the most equal of the big 6. As a 
result of these evolutions we observe that in 2007, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, there seems to be two groups of big countries showing a similar degree of 
inequality inside them: the first one, formed by Germany and Spain, with low disparities 
and the  second one,  made up by Italy,  France  and Poland,  which  were converging 
toward the same medium value of  T  and have been remaining around such value 
during the last three years of analysis.
Coming back to our initial  purpose to explain total  inequality within-country 
through the Theil Index inside the big 6, we can claim that the slight growth of  Twc  is 
mainly caused by the sum of the increasing trend of the United Kingdom and Poland 
slightly lessened by the result of Italy.
4.2.5 Between-country inequality
On the other side the reduction of inequality between-country can be observed 
looking at the figure 4.6 which shows the changes in the levels of national per capita 
income  occurred  in  EU27  (Luxembourg  excluded  as  an  outlier)  in  the  period 
considered.  We  can  easily  note  that  among  countries  which  in  1995  were  below 
European  average,  representing  1/3  of  EU  population,  all  but  Malta  –  which  has 
insignificant demographic weight (0.08% of EU) – in 2007 had reduced their distance 
from the mean, since their positions lies over the main diagonal. If we turn our glance to 
countries above average we see that evolution is not only toward the mean, but such 
movement  involves  countries  representing  almost  one  half  of  European  population, 
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whereas richer countries which lies over the main diagonal represent only 17.6% of the 
inhabitants of EU.
After  these  clarifications  we  can  conclude  that  the  reduction  of  inequality 
between-country is  the  result  of  the  joined effects  of  the  relative  growth of  all  the 
countries below average and of the different movements of the countries above it, the 
most relevant of them indeed converging.
Figure 4.6  Relations between national incomes in 1995 and in 2007.
4.3  Regional Convergence analysed among Macroareas
In chapter 2 we had found that spatial factors in terms of either a core/periphery, 
north/south  or  east/west  dichotomy  have  a  great  importance  in  order  to  explain 
differences and inequalities among European regions. But previously we had considered 
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spatial factors inside the countries, whereas now we are going to carry out a different 
analysis with the purpose of establishing whether a meaningful macrospatial structure 
exists  in  European  Union  and whether  it  has  more  relevance  with  respect  to  areas 
delimited  by national  borders.  The  emergence  of  macroareas  is  exactly  what  could 
happen  in  a  more  integrated  Europe  in  which  national  borders  will  become  less 
important and regions will interact directly with each others.
Figure 4.7  Map of European macroareas.
65
4-THE CONTRIBUTION TO INEQUALITY OF BETWEEN-COUNTRY AND WITHIN-COUNTRY COMPONENTS
A  core/periphery  structure  is  generally  identified  through  the  concept  of 
economic potential.  About the same topic,  Peschel (1981) suggests that the distance 
variable could be interpreted as a proxy for historical, cultural and linguistic influences. 
If we consider this, a similar value of the economic potential can have very different 
impacts in Northern Ireland, Andalucía or in the region of Bucharest. Then it appears 
adequate to combine the peripherality of regions in terms of economic potential with 
their cultural and historical background, which might be reflected in northern, southern 
or eastern location. The borders chosen to bound the resulting macroareas can be seen in 
figure 4.7.
The inequality emerging form this classification are shown in figure 4.8. We can 
note that between-macroarea component covers the greatest share of total  T , going 
from 75% in 1995 to 58.5% in 2007. From the comparison of this share with the one of 
the previously found between-country component during the same period, we observe 
that the former was less relevant, but both have been losing weight actually at the same 
speed, hence the pattern of macroarea and country structure is similar, but with different 
levels reflected by different component shares: macroareas have less disparities within 
them, id est they are more homogeneous than countries.
Figure 4.8  Evolution and decomposition of macroareas Theil Index.
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If we would like to look at  such degree of homogeneity inside them we can 
observe  figure  4.9,  which  shows  the  calculated  Theil  Index  for  each  of  them.  The 
macroarea with the highest intra-inequality is the Eastern Periphery which also shows a 
controversial trend, initially increasing, then decreasing and finally stationary around 
0.05. This reflects the effects of the epocal changes occurred in this area in the years  
immediately before our analysis and during it. Stronger inequalities are present also in 
the Core Area: evidence that a process of further concentration of activities and income 
is registered also inside the richest core of Europe, an area which goes from the Po 
Valley to Southern England passing through Rhine Valley and including Paris, Île de 
France.
Inequalities have also grown where they were very little, such as in Northern and 
Southern Peripheral area, whereas the only area where inequality has decreased is the 
Intermediate one, an example of satisfactorily uniform distribution of income among 
regions which have a good level of wealth.   
The evolution of the macroareas' situation in terms of income and population 
during the period 1995-2007 is resumed in table 4.2.
Figure 4.9  Inequalities within-macroarea.
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Table 4.2  Evolutions of income and population of macroareas.
Area Per capita GDP 
(EU27=100)
Share of EU27 
income
Share of EU27 
population 
% changes in 
shares
1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 income population
Core 140 130 0.430 0.404 0.308 0.311 – 6.0 1.1
Intermediate 107 105 0.304 0.303 0.285 0.289 – 0.2 1.3
North 106 111 0.080 0.084 0.075 0.076 5.4 0.7
East 39 50 0.074 0.089 0.190 0.178 19.2 – 6.2
South 79 82 0.112 0.120 0.143 0.147 6.8 3.1
The  only  area  that  has  not  been  converging  is  the  North.  However  such 
macroarea represents less than 10% of EU, whereas the others have been drawing near 
the average with a speed which is directly proportional to their initial distance from it. It  
is also worth remarking that Northern Periphery appears already completely integrated 
in Intermediate area, not suffering further negative forces due to its peripherality.
These results seems supporting the hypothesis according to which a delimitation 
of European borders on the basis of macroareas reflecting various degree of centrality 
and cardinal location has gained weight in comparison to the traditional national borders 
and could usefully substitute countries both in studies about regional convergence and 
as a basis for delineating regional policy strategies.
4.4 Conclusions
We have examined the issue of regional convergence with a different approach, 
using a traditional tool: the results obtained with this simple method are not completely 
different from those shown by the more sophisticated ones. There is convergence and if 
we consider the whole EU27, this has occurred mainly in the second sub-period, with 
the entry of the regions of CEECs, that indeed have increased inequalities in EU but 
basically are  the most  accountable for  a positive path of integration,  more than the 
Western  ones  which  seemed  to  have  already  reached  a  situation  of  stationary 
equilibrium of their own inequalities. 
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The conclusion of the decomposition that the chosen index allows is that the 
main responsible of the convergence is a strong reduction of inequality measured at 
country level, whereas within-country disparities among regions have slightly increased. 
We have then examined the most interesting single situations which let us to 
realise  that  under  this  point  of  view  the  panorama  is  very  heterogeneous, 
comprehending movements in every direction. We think that a special attention should 
be  directed  toward  preventing  national  convergences  at  the  expense  of  regional 
divergences. 
Finally,  we  should  have  brought  some  evidence  in  favour  of  an  alternative 
spatial structure emerged in Europe, transversally to the traditional national borders.
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5- An Analysis of the Determinants of Economic 
Growth through Barro Equations
We  finish  the  review  of  the  different  techniques  to  assess  convergence  by 
proposing a method that has been used in many studies by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
which mainly consists in setting a linear model where all the possible variables that 
have  some  power  in  explaining  economic  growth  enter.  The  chapter  begins  with  a 
description of the framework that leads to this kind of analysis, it continues in section 2 
with empirical results about absolute convergence and then, in section 3, it is presented 
the true purpose of the study,  that is  the findings about  quantitative impact of each 
variable on per capita GDP growth. Conclusions follow in section 4.
5.1  General and Theoretical Framework
The analysis of circumstances that in different regions can support or oppose 
economic growth may be structured under another point of view, which still shares with 
studies about conditional convergence the use of the same equation:
Δ y i t =  β log y i t−1 ∑
j
 j S j i t−1  u i t   [5.1]  
where per capita GDP growth of region i-th at time t  is influenced also by  S,  which is 
a  group  of  j independent  variables  that  can  catch  regional  differences  whether  of 
structural or institutional nature;  is the vector of the coefficients that weight the 
impact of  S  on growth. 
Such different method – often called “Barro equations”29 – in fact is not only 
aimed  at  assessing  net  convergence  without  conditioning  variables,  but  it  is  more 
general:  it  supposes that  regions could have both different  transitional  and different 
steady state growth rates, but this point is not as relevant as the identification of the 
29 Robert J. Barro used it for the first time (1991) .
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variables which extend their influence on economic development. 
In  order  to  understand  this  generalisation,  let  us  consider  the  situation 
represented in figure 5.1. Here we observe two regions provided of the same initial 
quantity of capital per effective worker 0 that have the following characteristics of 
their parameters:
• Saving rate is higher in region 1 (s1 > s2);
• Marginal productivity of capital is higher in region 1 (α1 > α2);
• technological progress is higher in region 1 (g1 > g2);
• population grows at the same rate in both regions (n1 = n2).
Figure 5.1  Situation of two developing regions having the same initial  quantity of  
capital per effective worker. Region 1 is advantaged whereas region 2 is penalised  by  
conditioning  variables  as  saving  rate,  marginal  productivity  of  capital  and  
technological progress.
We can thereby see that region 1 not only maintains always a higher transitional 
growth rate than region 2, but it converges toward a bigger steady state growth rate too. 
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5.1  GENERAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In such way it will reach the steady state path  κt,1* >  κt,2*  and it also keeps on growing 
at a constant rate always higher than the one of region 2. Obviously, the parameters and 
hence their effects, may be mixed variously, but what this approach suggests is that we 
cannot  distinguish  between  the  two  kinds  of  growth  rate  we  have  mentioned  with 
equation [5.1]. After all, as we said, this is not the matter, since what we are concerned 
with is identifying what variables condition economic growth – especially those that 
could be manipulated with policies – and in which direction.
The  way  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  carry  out  their  analyses  is  by  setting  an 
equation as [5.1]: once a set of variables able to explain growth is chosen, they calculate 
regression's  coefficients and finally they can examine the effect  of each variable  by 
studying its relationship with residual growth which remains once the impact of the 
other variables has been subtracted.
5.2  Absolute Convergence
We first examine the plot representing the net relationship between logarithm of 
1995 per capita GDP and total economic growth experienced in the period from 1995 to 
2007. The difference with the analysis carried out in chapter 2 is that here we do not use 
panel  data.  Solow-Swan  and  Ramsey  models  predict  absolute  convergence,  that  is 
poorer countries should grow faster and tend hence to catch up to the more developed 
economies.  Such a  result  implies  that  growth rate  of  per  capita  GDP in the  period 
observed should be inversely related to the initial level of per capita GDP registered in 
the same regions. 
Figure 5.2 shows that these data do not allow to reject the hypothesis of absolute 
convergence.  The  correlation  between the  two variables  is  indeed  negative,  –  0.52, 
although,  observing better,  if  we split  up countries  in two cluster,  as highlighted in 
figure 5.2, it seems that all the correlation could be explained by the difference between 
the  clusters,  while  correlation  is  virtually  nil  inside  the  clusters  (actually  slightly 
positive among poorer regions). 
In  short  we  find  clues  of  absolute  convergence,  but  the  phenomenon  has  a 
peculiar  outline  and  it  is  fundamental  to  examine  the  overall  impact  of  the  other 
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variables on growth.
Figure 5.2  Simple correlation between growth and level of GDP.
5.3  Conditional Convergence 
5.3.1  Other variables influencing growth
Barro's  empirical  framework  relates  per  capita  growth  rate  to  two  kinds  of 
variables:  initial  level  of  state  variables,  basically the  stock  of  human and physical 
capital  present  in  each region;  and a  number  of  control  or  environmental  variables 
which  reflect  various  demographic  conditions,  political  situation,  structural 
characteristics of the territory considered and so on.
The function for regional per capita growth rate during period  t  can be written 
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as follows:
Δ y t= f  y t−1 , k t−1 , h t−1 , envt , ...     [5.2]  
where y , k and h are the state variables just mentioned and env,... comprises an array of 
the  other  influences.  Considering  both  [5.1]  and  [5.2]  we can  define  a  regression's 
model given by:
y˙i
yi
= const   log y i ∑
m
m K i m ∑
n
n H i n ∑
q
q ENV i q  ui    [5.3]
Empirically, entering 1995 per capita level of GDP in logarithmic form means 
that its regression's coefficient represents the rate of convergence, since it measures the 
variation of the growth rate to a proportional change in y t−1 . In our regression30 k and 
h are represented by:
• average level of educational attainment (EDUL);
• percentage of workers in technological and scientific sectors (TECHSCIE);
• per capita gross fixed capital formation (PCGFCF)31;
• the  interaction  between logarithm of  initial  level  of  income and the  average 
years of education (GDP * EDU): theories of technological diffusion usually 
assume that more human capital raises the ability of absorbing new technologies. 
This happens, for example, when a higher human capital makes lesser the cost of 
imitating ideas discovered in other places. The interaction means that having a 
more educated population raises the responsiveness of y˙ / y to reductions in 
initial  level  of  per  capita  income  and  thereby  the  result  of  such  effect,  if 
30 For a review of the variables, their features and the reasons why they could explain economic growth, 
see section 3.3.1.
31 Of course, this is not a stock, but a flow. There are problems in the use of data about capital, especially 
concerning the assumptions about depreciation. Anyway we think that in EU case, capital per worker 
should be very related with the level of income and its evolution is satisfactorily caught by fixed 
capital formation. The advantages of taking into account this kind of capital are explained in section 
3.3.
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coefficient is negative, is a speed-up of convergence. 
In the neoclassical models of Solow-Swan and Ramsey, the effects of the control 
and environmental variables on the growth rate correspond to their impact on steady-
state position. Variables included in regression are32:
• demographic density (DEN), which can measure if there are scale effects due to 
agglomeration  of  people  that  reflects  agglomeration  of  human  capital  and 
economic activities;
• net  migration  (MIGR),  representing  the  flows  of  human  capital,  under  a 
quantitative point of view. This is also the most important variable to define the 
net increment of population in a Europe which has not significant differences 
among regions in terms of fertility, birth and death rates: that is the reason why 
we have excluded them from the model;
• kilometres  of  infrastructures  with  respect  to  regional  surface  (INFSUR),  an 
indicator of public physical structures that are at disposition of the economic 
agents;
• the size of financial  development  (FIN),  which can help the availability and 
mobility of capital  and in  this  way support productive investments that have 
beneficial effects on growth. The proxy used to measure it is the relative size of 
the sector over the whole economy; 
• the share of public expenditure over the total gross domestic product (PUBEX). 
It is assumed that this kind of expenditure does not affect directly productivity, 
but it implies a distortion of private decisions which has negative repercussions 
on economic environment and hence leads to a lower growth;
• an  index  representative  of  the  political  framework  (POL).  This  index  is  an 
adjusted version of the overall political risk rating published in the International 
Country  Risk  Guide,  including  only  the  dimensions  of  internal  conflict, 
corruption, law and order and bureaucracy quality. Such aspects are problematic 
in many ways and with different results, but the basic idea is that they imply a 
32 POL, DEM, CRIM are disposable at NUTS-0 level and not at NUTS-2 level.
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waste of resources which could be otherwise employed a in more productive 
way;
• an index which summarises the democratic conditions of the country to which 
regions  pertain  (DEM).  The  effect  of  the  level  of  democracy  on  economic 
growth is very controversial: in literature there are examples which support the 
hypothesis that having more democracy is a better conditions in order to grow; 
other  authors  put  stress  on  cases  where  a  reduction  of  democracy  was  a 
successful  strategy  to  preserve  the  economy of  a  country:  in  fact  there  are 
dictatorial regimes that have a fundamental role in assuring stability condition. A 
general result commonly accepted is that for poorer areas, more democracy has 
good influences  on  growth,  then  the  effect  lessens  and,  for  richer  countries, 
further increases of democracy have negative impact. That could be the case of 
EU,  which  without  doubt  is  made  up  of  countries  that  at  world  level  have 
satisfactory quality of their democracies.
• the number of crimes perpetrated (CRIM) to capture security conditions;
• a dummy to indicate that a region has lately joined the Union since pertaining to 
Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries  (CEECs).  This  reflects  not  only 
geographical  conditions  as  underlined  by  the  name,  but  also  historical 
conditions,  since  with  two  little  exceptions  (Malta  and  Cyprus)  this  dummy 
identifies all former communist regimes;
• a dummy to indicate that a region had been receiving structural funds relative to 
objective 1 (FUND) up to 2006. That is also the simplest way to assess if such 
funds have had any effect on growth of the receiving regions.
We have excluded some variable  commonly used  in  this  kind  of  regression, 
because they were not significant in a European framework, even if it was so at world 
level: that is the case, for example, of health conditions measured by life expectancy; of 
the differences between male and female schooling and education; of the previously 
mentioned natural trend of population and so on.
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5.3.2  Single variables impact analyses
Table 5.1  shows results  from regression made by using equation [5.3].  The 
regression is applied to a cross-section of the regions which today form EU27, excluded 
the overseas territories of France, for which there are problem of missing values and 
their distance from Europe weakens the effect of integration. The dependent variable, 
once again, is average annual growth rate of per capita GDP registered during the period 
from 1995 to 2007.
Table 5.1  Summary of regression.
Independent variable Coefficient t-value p-value
Constant 0.2053   5.008 0.000
Log PC GDP 1995 – 1.998 ∙ 10-2 – 3.938 0.000
DEN   7.884 ∙ 10-7   1.002 0.317
MIGR   4.957  ∙ 10-4   3.443 0.001 
EDUL   8.283  ∙ 10-3   0.903 0.367
GDP * EDU – 3.563  ∙ 10-4 – 1.821 0.070 
TECHSCIE   5.779  ∙ 10-4   4.241 0.000 
PCGFCF  1.914  ∙ 10-6   2.441 0.015 
INFSUR – 1.494  ∙ 10-4 – 4.007 0.000 
FIN   7.483  ∙ 10-4   3.197 0.002
PUBEX – 9.330  ∙ 10-4 – 5.415 0.000 
POL   1.259  ∙ 10-3   3.063 0.002
DEM   4.945  ∙ 10-3   2.751 0.006
CRIM – 1.296  ∙ 10-4 – 3.316 0.001
CEEC   7.314  ∙ 10-3   1.972 0.050
FUND   3.078  ∙ 10-3   1.606 0.109
R2 0.596
Number of observations 267
F-statistic 26.6 0.000 
Estimation is calculated with OLS method.
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Initial level of per capita GDP
As we know, for given values of the other explanatory variables, the neoclassical 
model predicts a negative coefficient of initial logarithm of GDP that represents the rate 
with  which  economy tends  to  approach  its  long-run  position.  The  1995  per  capita 
income level has an estimated coefficient of – 0.020 (0.005) which is highly significant 
and represents a conditional rate of convergence of 2% per year33. Hence convergence is 
present  and registered but,  once again,  it  is  slow and it  would take 34 years to get 
halfway  toward  the  steady-state   level  of  product34.   In  this  model,   the  correlation 
Figure 5.3  Growth rate versus level of per capita GDP.
In this figure and in the followings the vertical axis shows the growth rate of GDP after filtering out 
the parts explained by all explanatory variables other than the one indicated on horizontal axis.
33 This  is  an  approximation because the growth rate  is  observed as  an  average  over  12 years.  The  
corresponding instantaneous rate of convergence is slightly higher than this value (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995).
34 Slow rates of convergence have been found in other regional studies about USA states,  Canadian 
provinces, Japanese prefectures (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
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between initial income and growth has grown until – 0.67 and the better fit is clearly 
defined in the graph of figure 5.3 that, in addition, allows to exclude that the relation 
could be non-linear or driven by some outlier. Finally we must say that the correlation 
of income with the other variables is generally high and its effect can thereby also be 
caught by them.
Initial level of human capital
Initial level of human capital appears in two variables of the model and in the 
interaction  with  income.  First,  the  average  level  of  educational  attainment  of  the 
regional population from 25 to 64 years old. This indicator is initially measured in four 
categories, assigning null value to people who has not schooling; one to those who have 
attained  lower secondary education  corresponding to level 2 of  ISCED35;  two for who 
Figure 5.4  Growth rate versus educational levels.
35 The  International  Standard  Classification  of  Education  (ISCED),  designed  by  UNESCO,  is  an 
instrument  suitable  for  assembling,  compiling  and  presenting  statistics  of  education  both  within 
individual countries and internationally.
80
5.3  CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE 
has reached upper secondary education (level 3) and finally three for persons who have 
achieved at least level 5 of ISCED, corresponding to tertiary education. After this the 
resulting index is just a weighted mean with the size of each group. The regression 
shows that there is a positive effect of education on growth, but the coefficient is not 
significant. An extra level of education, which implies at least three further years of 
school or university, is estimated to raise the growth rate by just 0.8%. This means that 
what Europe has experienced in the period considered is not a growth based on human 
capital  in  terms  of  school  education  received.  The  weak  partial  relation  between 
education and growth rate (correlation is 0.18) is shown in figure 5.4.
The  second  variable  representing  human  capital  is  percentage  of  human 
resources in scientific and technological sectors over active population. Its coefficient is 
Figure  5.5  Relation  between  regional  educational  levels  and  human resources  in  
scientific and technological sectors (red line is simply drawn without calculation).
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very significant, 0.00058 (0.00013), therefore if more workers are employed in such 
sectors,  growth  will  be  stronger.  It  is  worth  to  underline  that  this  variable  is  very 
influenced by educational level (the relation is quadratic) which has its repercussions on 
employment  choices:  hence  we  might  conclude  that  there  is  no  direct  connection 
between education and growth, but education acts indirectly on development through 
the working sectors chosen as consequence of it. In figure 5.5 it is shown the quadratic 
relation previously mentioned, according to which an extra education has a positive 
impact that is more than proportional on the percentage of human resources in the most 
productive and innovative sectors. In figure 5.6 is finally represented the usual partial 
relation between highly skilled workers and residual growth.
Figure 5.6  Growth rate versus workers in scientific and technological sectors.
We complete the analysis of the human capital observing that its interaction in 
terms of years of education with initial level of GDP is negative ( – 0.00036 [0.00020]): 
it is not a big value, even if it is significant at 10%, but it confirms that the growth rate  
is  more  sensitive  to  log(GDP)  when  human  capital  is  higher.  Such  result  supports 
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theories that point out the positive effect of education on a territory's ability to absorb 
new technologies. The partial relation appears in figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7  Growth rate versus interaction between education and income.
We clarify again that measure of health condition, obviously of great importance 
when  we  talk  about  human  capital  and  generally  very  significant  in  a  worldwide 
framework,  has not  been included in the model  because its  regional  differences  are 
relatively  of  a  not  relevant  extent.  With  respect  to  expenditure  in  research  and 
development – that was used in other studies also as a proxy  for assessing the quality of 
education, integrating the quantitative measures, but that could also be use to include 
the effort toward innovation of an economy – we found that, in the period considered, 
there was not any effect of this variable calculated with Barro equations method.
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Demographic variables
In the model we inserted demographic density as a proxy able to assess if there 
are  scale  effects  due  to  agglomeration  of  people  which  in  some  way  implies 
agglomeration  of  human  capital  and  economic  activities.  The  coefficient  is  not 
significant and it  allows to reject the hypothesis  that the most urbanized areas have 
grown more than the rural areas. The lack of correlation, 0.08, can be clearly seen in 
figure 5.8, which shows the partial effect of demographic density on growth only for 
regions for which it is < 1000, excluding, among the others, the extreme outlier of Inner 
London (8377 inhabitants/km2) that actually can be responsible of the slight slope of the 
regression line. 
Net migration has again a positive coefficient and it has also a significant impact 
on growth.  Generally we are  used  to  observe  negative  coefficients  relatively to  the 
growth of population or fertility rate (proxy for natural demographic trend): this result
Figure 5.8  Growth rate versus demographic density.
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Figure 5.9  Growth rate versus migration.
could be trivial if we consider that the variable we are looking at is per capita income. 
On the other side, migration has peculiar features with respect to natural demographic 
trend, not only because economic variables that give them impulses are not the same, 
but especially because when we talk about an immigrant, we are referring to a person 
who is already skilled – on the contrary of a new born – and hence the argument of 
human capital enters directly in this demographic topic. A positive coefficient means 
that the contribution that  more immigrants give to an economy is  stronger than the 
negative impact that they have on per capita  GDP by simply increasing population. 
Partial relation between net rate of migration and economic growth is shown in figure 
5.9.
Investments in fixed capital
In the neoclassical model saving rate is equal to the ratio of investment. A higher 
saving rate raises the steady-state level of output per worker and hence increases the 
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growth rate for a given starting value of income.
We talked about the advantages of considering the fixed capital  formation in 
section 3.3 and in note 22, hence we have chosen to consider it again in this model with 
the double role of measuring, as a proxy, the total level of investments of each region 
and catching the evolution of the disposable capital per worker which has a fundamental 
relevance in explaining growth according to the neoclassical model. The limitations of 
this variable are that it measures just a part of total investments and we can only assume 
that such part has a similar size in every region; on the other side, the fixed capital 
formation does not reveal anything about the already existing quantity of disposable 
capital in each region and it omits completely the capital depreciation36. 
Another  problem which arises when this  kind of variables  is  used is  reverse
Figure 5.10  Growth rate versus per capita gross fixed capital formation.
36 These latter are matters of difficult estimate even at a country level and it would have been very hard 
to transpose them to a regional level without the risk to incur in problems or incoherences.
86
5.3  CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE 
causation,  that  is  a  positive  coefficient  might  reflect  the  positive  relation  between 
growth  opportunities  and  investment  rather  than  the  positive  impact  of  higher 
exogenous  investments  on  growth  rate.  Empirical  studies37 have  found  that  when 
contemporaneous  investment  are  used  as  regressor,  the  coefficient  is  statistically 
significant, whereas if it is used as instrument the level of investment in a previous, but 
contiguous period, the relation is still positive, but it loses significance.
Choosing as instrument an average of the flows of gross fixed capital formation 
during the first sub-period in order to minimise these inconveniences, its coefficient is 
positive, significant at 5% but not at 1% and its meaning is that one thousand Euros 
more  of  investments  in  fixed  assets  raise  growth  of  almost  0.2%:  we may thereby 
confirm  to  some  extent  the  beneficial  effect  of  the  capital  formation  on  economic 
growth.
Infrastructures
Maybe  the  most  surprising  result  of  this  regression  is  the  negative  relation 
between the presence of transport infrastructures and economic growth, represented in 
figure 5.11.
We are used to think that more developed infrastructures, through the lowering 
of cost of transport, stimulate trade and finally output38. An explanation of the reasons 
why economic growth has been stronger in those regions which were less endowed of 
infrastructures  can be found in the new economic geography:  as it  was stressed by 
Philippe Martin (2002), there are regions, basically the peripheral ones, for which new 
infrastructures have the effect to lead them to a further impoverishment: “if we look at 
the case of industries with economies of scale, a policy to open up peripheral regions 
may have a paradoxical effect.  By reducing transaction costs for inter-regional trade, 
such  a policy may encourage firms to exploit their economies of scale by concentrating 
production in a single location. For firms whose wage cost is relatively low, this will  
mean concentrating production in the wealthy region, even if it means exporting part of 
that  production  to  the  poor  region  at  low  cost,  thanks  to  the  new  transport
37 Blömstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1993) and Barro (1997)
38 The same happens in a monetary integration with respect to transaction costs.
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Figure 5.11  Growth rate versus transport infrastructures.
infrastructures”39. Once production has been moved, with a lower labour demand, it is 
probable that we could observe effects on migration too and in such cases the final 
effect of larger infrastructures is, for the regions concerned, less capital and less human 
resources. 
Under another point of view we should also consider again that during the years 
from 1995 to 2007, strong episodes of growth have been registered in regions which 
have increased dramatically their construction sector, which were the ones less endowed 
of  infrastructures.  As  consequence  of  it  we  might  think  that  a  part  of  the  growth 
observed could be based in the realization of infrastructures in the regions which had 
not them.
Anyway to the previous argument should be paid special attention during the 
decisional process of realization of a transport infrastructure, because too often we hear 
39 See Martin and Rogers (1995), and Martin (1999).
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the empty equation “infrastructure equals development”, without a deeper consideration 
of the overall effects to which these may lead.
Figure 5.12  Growth rate versus size of financial sector.
Financial market
Some analyses have stressed the important role of the domestic financial system 
to stimulate growth. A developed financial system provide better instruments to support 
growth as  said before.  However  also  with this  variable  there could  be problems of 
reverse causation, since the process of increasing the size of financial is registered in 
any experience of growth, but we excluded them by using data of 1995, just  at  the 
beginning of the period considered, and the coefficient of the relation shown in figure 
5.12 is positive and highly significant. It is worth remarking that the sizes of the other 
sectors have not had overall significant coefficient in explaining growth, hence we can 
assign a kind of supremacy to financial sector, even if the regions where it was more 
development suffered to a larger extent the latest financial crisis. In any way finance can 
substitute real economy.
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Figure 5.13  Growth rate versus government consumption.
Government consumption
One of the most significant coefficient of the regression in table 5.1 is the one 
relative to the ratio of public expenditure over total GDP. Data are at country level and 
are intended to be a proxy to measure non-productive spending that furthermore affect 
economic system through the associated taxation, which, as usual, implies distortions in 
agents' choices. The estimated coefficient, 0.00093 (0.00017), means that a reduction of 
one point in the ratio of government consumption contributes to increase growth of 
almost 0.1%. The partial relation shown in figure 5.13 confirms that big government is 
bad for growth.
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Figure 5.14  Growth rate versus political situation. 
Political framework
Using this kind of index was first proposed by Knack and Keefer (1995). We 
have used a reduced version with respect to what Barro calls rule-of-law variable: this is 
mainly  because  there  are  dimensions  which  are  relevant  worldwide  –  for  example 
external conflict, military in politics and religious or ethnic tensions – but that are not 
sensitive in a European framework. We have specified before the dimensions which 
form this index: in addition to the waste of resources that internal conflict, corruption or 
bureaucracy cause, another underlying idea is that a positive political framework can 
raise the attractiveness of a territory for investment with further obvious repercussions 
on  growth.  The  index  is  subjective,  but  it  is  prepared  by  expert  for  fee-paying 
international investors and this is in some way a guarantee of its validity and accuracy.
We can observe the partial  relation between political  framework and growth, 
which is significantly positive, in figure 5.14. Specifically an improvement of one point 
in this ranking has the effect to raise growth of more than 0.1%.
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Democracy
The democracy variable,  another  subjective measure,  considered at  European 
level has not the same effect which has been registered worldwide by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin. According to  their studies the relations between it and growth is quadratic and 
negative when levels of democracy are already satisfactorily high (the overall situation 
of countries which form EU). The estimated coefficient of our model 0.0049 (0.0018) is 
positive,  hence  an  improvement  in  the  quality  of  European  democracies  has  still 
positive effects on growth. Furthermore, looking at the partial relation shown in figure 
5.15, it appears clear that in this case we can exclude the quadratic form.
Figure 5.15  Growth rate versus democracy index.
Regional dummies
From the estimated coefficients of regional dummies it appears that growth has 
been stronger at 5% of significance in the regions pertaining to the counties that joined 
EU in the last ten years. Here, in the period considered, it was experienced an increase 
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of  income on average  of  0.7% than elsewhere.  The same cannot  be  said about  the 
western regions  which,  during  the  same years  and specifically during  the  first  sub-
period, had been receiving structural funds since they had requirements to be part of 
Objective 1 areas (per capita GDP below 75% EU15 average). The coefficient of their 
dummy is positive but not significant neither at 10% confidence, hence from this simple 
result it could be concluded that regional aids had not relevant effect on growth. Of 
course  there  are  better,  deeper  and more  precise  ways  to  assess  what  has  been the 
impact of Community funds: literature about this topic is already very enormous and 
authors often have opposite ideas and conclusions,  but this  simple method could be 
sufficient to feed the debate on whether there are better ways, more effective and less 
distorting to stimulate growth in depressed regions.
Figure 5.16  Distributions of residual growth for groups of dummy variables.
In figure 5.16 we can see which are the different distributions of the residual 
growth for the three groups emerging by using dummy variables (regions pertaining to 
CEECs,  regions  financed  with  structural  funds  and  the  others)  once  we  have  held 
constant all the other variables. The regions others than those indicated by dummies 
present  a  more  concentrated  distribution  which  differs  from the  distribution  of  the 
Objective 1 areas because the latter is slightly more skewed to the right. On the contrary 
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distribution of CEEC regions is not very concentrated and has a much thicker right tail. 
Then also from the graph we can conclude that relevant differences in partial growth 
performances exists between CEECs regions and the EU15 regions and not inside EU15 
between Objective 1 areas and the rest.  
Other variables
Among other variables that often enter in Barro equations, as inflation rate or 
openness  to  trade,  the  only  we  have  found  to  be  significant  is  the  ratio  of  crime 
perpetrated  over  the  regional  population,  which  is  easily  interpreted  as  a  proxy of 
security conditions. Negative coefficient supports the idea that regions which are less 
afflicted  by criminality  grow more  than  the  others  and in  this  sense  a  government 
investment in security might maybe be productive.
5.4   Conclusions
There is a large set of explanatory variables which influence the different per 
capita regional growth rate in European Union. Conditional convergence is confirmed, 
even if the process is slow. The estimated coefficients of human and physical capital are 
consistent with neoclassical theories, whereas we do not register any impact of natural 
population  trend  and  health  conditions.  The  only  demographic  variable  which  is 
significant is net migration, able to enrich per capita regional GDP, despite it implies an 
increase of population. Our findings exclude agglomeration effects, but we remark that, 
generally,  environmental conditions are relevant to support growth or not hamper it. 
Finally, this analysis does not allows to reject the hypothesis that Community structural 
funds have had no impact on growth of the regions which have received them.
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From the analyses of convergence in per capita GDP among European regions 
using alternative methods  emerge many common results  and some finding which is 
different according to the kind of technique applied. 
In general the presence of a slow process of convergence is confirmed, but we 
have  not  detected  unique  findings  about  its  evolution:  specifically   β-convergence 
estimated on panel data and inequality measured through Theil Index seem to support 
the idea that the process occurred mainly in the second sub-period, characterized by the 
effectiveness  of  European  Monetary  Union  and  by  the  entry  of  CEECs;  whereas 
Markovian systems suggest that in the same period it was experienced a slow down of 
convergence with respect to the previous years.
About  β-convergence we remark that, if we consider it in absolute terms, the 
estimated coefficients are always lower than 2% which is the normal speed registered 
by the most researches worldwide. This result  pushes to think that, even in Europe, 
convergence is indeed a conditional process and, in fact, models setted for assessing this 
option have fitted significantly better.
There is a large set of factors which are founded to be able to have significant 
influence on economic growth. In this field it is worth to note that, both with parametric 
and non-parametric analyses, educations does not seem to have played an important role 
in  regional  development.  Especially  with  the  study based  on  Markovian  process  it 
appears that the strong growth experienced by some lagging areas has not solid roots 
and the crises of the last years, to some extent, has confirmed this suspicion: what often 
seemed  economic  miracles  were  just  property  bubbles.  Nevertheless  Barro  analysis 
suggests that there could be an indirect impact of education. Net migration, which has 
implications both in terms of population and of human resources,  is  a  factor  which 
surely is resulted positive, but we have excluded agglomeration effects even if capitals' 
regions are the ones that have grown more.
In  addition  to  these  factors  we  should  never  forget  that  geographical  and 
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historical  dimensions  are  fundamental  for  explaining  what  happens  in  Europe: 
Mediterranean regions, which pertain to EU since long time, have not almost changed 
their relative position, although they had received relevant amounts of aid; Eastern and 
former communist regions have improved a lot their situation but they are still far from 
average levels of income of EU. The clubs of convergence which emerge in the Union 
follow,  hence,  a  core/periphery pattern which is  not  very different  from the  current 
situation. Under this aspect we can detect the existence of a spatial structure which does 
not take national borders into consideration.
Moreover, decomposition of total inequality confirms what emerged from other 
studies:  the  most  of  convergence  achieved  is  due  to  reduction  in  between-country 
disparity at the expense of a greater inequality inside the countries.
Finally, we must remark that the scenario is constantly in evolution and it is easy 
observe  great  changes  just  in  a  few months,  hence  the  importance  of  this  topic  at 
European level will be bound to capture, in the future more than ever, the attention  of 
economists and policy makers.  
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List of Regions 
BE10 Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen
BE22 Prov. Limburg
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen
BE24 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon
BE32 Prov. Hainaut
BE33 Prov. Liège
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg
BE35 Prov. Namur
BG31 Severozapaden
BG32 Severen tsentralen
BG33 Severoiztochen
BG34 Yugoiztochen
BG41 Yugozapaden
BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen
CZ01 Praha
CZ02 Strední Cechy
CZ03 Jihozápad
CZ04 Severozápad
CZ05 Severovýchod
CZ06 Jihovýchod
CZ07 Strední Morava
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko
DK01 Hovedstaden
DK02 Sjælland
DK03 Syddanmark
DK04 Midtjylland
DK05 Nordjylland
DE11 Stuttgart
DE12 Karlsruhe
DE13 Freiburg
DE14 Tübingen
DE21 Oberbayern
DE22 Niederbayern
DE23 Oberpfalz
DE24 Oberfranken
DE25 Mittelfranken
DE26 Unterfranken
DE27 Schwaben
DE30 Berlin
DE41 Brandenburg - Nordost
DE42 Brandenburg - Südwest
DE50 Bremen
DE60 Hamburg
DE71 Darmstadt
DE72 Gießen
DE73 Kassel
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
DE91 Braunschweig
DE92 Hannover
DE93 Lüneburg
DE94 Weser-Ems
DEA1 Düsseldorf
DEA2 Köln
DEA3 Münster
DEA4 Detmold
DEA5 Arnsberg
DEB1 Koblenz
DEB2 Trier
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz
DEC0 Saarland
DED1 Chemnitz
DED2 Dresden
DED3 Leipzig
DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt
DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein
DEG0 Thüringen
EE00 Eesti
IE01 Border, Midland and Western
IE02 Southern and Eastern
GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia
GR14 Thessalia
GR21 Ipeiros
GR22 Ionia Nisia
GR23 Dytiki Ellada
GR24 Sterea Ellada
GR25 Peloponnisos
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GR30 Attiki
GR41 Voreio Aigaio
GR42 Notio Aigaio
GR43 Kriti
ES11 Galicia
ES12 Principado de Asturias
ES13 Cantabria
ES21 País Vasco
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra
ES23 La Rioja
ES24 Aragón
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid
ES41 Castilla y León
ES42 Castilla-la Mancha
ES43 Extremadura
ES51 Cataluña
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana
ES53 Illes Balears
ES61 Andalucía
ES62 Región de Murcia
ES63 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta
ES64 Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla
ES70 Canarias
FR10 Île de France
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne
FR22 Picardie
FR23 Haute-Normandie
FR24 Centre
FR25 Basse-Normandie
FR26 Bourgogne
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais
FR41 Lorraine
FR42 Alsace
FR43 Franche-Comté
FR51 Pays de la Loire
FR52 Bretagne
FR53 Poitou-Charentes
FR61 Aquitaine
FR62 Midi-Pyrénées
FR63 Limousin
FR71 Rhône-Alpes
FR72 Auvergne
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
FR83 Corse
FR91 Guadeloupe
FR92 Martinique
FR93 Guyane
FR94 Réunion
ITC1 Piemonte
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste
ITC3 Liguria
ITC4 Lombardia
ITD1 Provincia Autonoma Bolzano/Bozen
ITD2 Provincia Autonoma Trento
ITD3 Veneto
ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
ITD5 Emilia-Romagna
ITE1 Toscana
ITE2 Umbria
ITE3 Marche
ITE4 Lazio
ITF1 Abruzzo
ITF2 Molise
ITF3 Campania
ITF4 Puglia
ITF5 Basilicata
ITF6 Calabria
ITG1 Sicilia
ITG2 Sardegna
CY00 Kypros/Kibris
LV00 Latvija
LT00 Lietuva
LU00 Luxembourg
HU10 Közép-Magyarország
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl
HU23 Dél-Dunántúl
HU31 Észak-Magyarország
HU32 Észak-Alföld
HU33 Dél-Alföld
MT00 Malta
NL11 Groningen
NL12 Friesland
NL13 Drenthe
NL21 Overijssel
NL22 Gelderland
NL23 Flevoland
NL31 Utrecht
NL32 Noord-Holland
NL33 Zuid-Holland
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NL34 Zeeland
NL41 Noord-Brabant
NL42 Limburg
AT11 Burgenland
AT12 Niederösterreich
AT13 Wien
AT21 Kärnten
AT22 Steiermark
AT31 Oberösterreich
AT32 Salzburg
AT33 Tirol
AT34 Vorarlberg
PL11 Lódzkie
PL12 Mazowieckie
PL21 Malopolskie
PL22 Slaskie
PL31 Lubelskie
PL32 Podkarpackie
PL33 Swietokrzyskie
PL34 Podlaskie
PL41 Wielkopolskie
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie
PL43 Lubuskie
PL51 Dolnoslaskie
PL52 Opolskie
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie
PL63 Pomorskie
PT11 Norte
PT15 Algarve
PT16 Centro
PT17 Lisboa
PT18 Alentejo
PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores
PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira
RO11 Nord-Vest
RO12 Centru
RO21 Nord-Est
RO22 Sud-Est
RO31 Sud - Muntenia
RO32 Bucuresti - Ilfov
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia
RO42 Vest
SI01 Vzhodna Slovenija
SI02 Zahodna Slovenija
SK01 Bratislavský kraj
SK02 Západné Slovensko
SK03 Stredné Slovensko
SK04 Východné Slovensko
FI13 Itä-Suomi
FI18 Etelä-Suomi
FI19 Länsi-Suomi
FI1A Pohjois-Suomi
FI20 Åland
SE11 Stockholm
SE12 Östra Mellansverige
SE21 Småland med öarna
SE22 Sydsverige
SE23 Västsverige
SE31 Norra Mellansverige
SE32 Mellersta Norrland
SE33 Övre Norrland
UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham
UKC2 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear
UKD1 Cumbria
UKD2 Cheshire
UKD3 Greater Manchester
UKD4 Lancashire
UKD5 Merseyside
UKE1 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire
UKE2 North Yorkshire
UKE3 South Yorkshire
UKE4 West Yorkshire
UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire
UKF3 Lincolnshire
UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire
UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
UKG3 West Midlands
UKH1 East Anglia
UKH2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire
UKH3 Essex
UKI1 Inner London
UKI2 Outer London
UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire
UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex
UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
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UKJ4 Kent
UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area
UKK2 Dorset and Somerset
UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
UKK4 Devon
UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys
UKL2 East Wales
UKM2 Eastern Scotland
UKM3 South Western Scotland
UKM5 North Eastern Scotland
UKM6 Highlands and Islands
UKN0 Northern Ireland
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